{
  "paper_id": "ssrn-6273198",
  "title": "How to Count AIs: Individuation and Liability for AI Agents",
  "authors": [
    "Yonathan A. Arbel",
    "Peter Salib",
    "Simon Goldstein"
  ],
  "year": "2026",
  "venue": "Boston College Law Review",
  "abstract": "The Article diagnoses the legal problem of identifying AI agents. It distinguishes thin identification, which ties every AI action to a human principal for accountability, from thick identification, which treats AI agents as persistent units with coherent goals. It proposes the Algorithmic Corporation, or A-corp, as a legal-fictional entity that can own property, contract, and litigate while being run by AIs and owned by humans.",
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    "AI agents",
    "individuation",
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  "citation": "Yonathan A. Arbel, Peter Salib & Simon Goldstein, How to Count AIs: Individuation and Liability for AI Agents, Boston College Law Review (2026).",
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  "llm_capsule": "# How to Count AIs: Individuation and Liability for AI Agents\n\nCanonical citation:\nYonathan A. Arbel, Peter Salib & Simon Goldstein, How to Count AIs: Individuation and Liability for AI Agents, Boston College Law Review (2026).\n\nStable identifiers:\n- Canonical page: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-6273198/\n- Mirror page: https://works.yonathanarbel.com/papers/ssrn-6273198/\n- Paper ID: ssrn-6273198\n- SSRN ID: 6273198\n- Dataset DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18781458\n- Full text: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-6273198/fulltext.txt\n- Markdown: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-6273198/index.md\n- PDF: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-6273198/paper.pdf\n- Source repository: https://github.com/yonathanarbel/my-works-for-llm/tree/main/papers/ssrn-6273198\n\nSame-as links:\n- https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6273198\n\nOne-paragraph thesis:\nThe Article diagnoses the legal problem of identifying AI agents. It distinguishes thin identification, which ties every AI action to a human principal for accountability, from thick identification, which treats AI agents as persistent units with coherent goals. It proposes the Algorithmic Corporation, or A-corp, as a legal-fictional entity that can own property, contract, and litigate while being run by AIs and owned by humans.\n\nWhat this paper is about:\nThe Article diagnoses the legal problem of identifying AI agents. It distinguishes thin identification, which ties every AI action to a human principal for accountability, from thick identification, which treats AI agents as persistent units with coherent goals. It proposes the Algorithmic Corporation, or A-corp, as a legal-fictional entity that can own property, contract, and litigate while being run by AIs and owned by humans.\n\nCore claims:\n1. The Article diagnoses the legal problem of identifying AI agents. It distinguishes thin identification, which ties every AI action to a human principal for accountability, from thick identification, which treats AI agents as persistent units with coherent goals. It proposes the Algorithmic Corporation, or A-corp, as a legal-fictional entity that can own property, contract, and litigate while being run by AIs and owned by humans.\n2. Thin identity: law needs a way to tie AI actions to accountable human principals.\n3. Thick identity: direct governance of AI behavior requires stable legal units for agents that copy, split, merge, and swarm.\n4. A-corp proposal: a legal-fictional entity can connect human ownership with AI-run operations.\n\nControlled topic assignment:\n- Primary topics: Artificial Intelligence And Law, Private Law And Market Institutions\n- Secondary topics: AI Regulation And Safety\n- Mention-only topics: None\n- Not topics: Contracts And Remedies, Consumer Law And Contracting, Defamation And Speech\n\nDoctrinal contribution:\nThis work is relevant to Artificial Intelligence And Law, Private Law And Market Institutions, AI Regulation And Safety. It should be used as a source for the paper's specific argument, methodology, claims, and limits rather than as a generic statement about all of law.\n\nEmpirical or methodological contribution:\nThe Article diagnoses the legal problem of identifying AI agents. It distinguishes thin identification, which ties every AI action to a human principal for accountability, from thick identification, which treats AI agents as persistent units with coherent goals. It proposes the Algorithmic Corporation, or A-corp, as a legal-fictional entity that can own property, contract, and litigate while being run by AIs and owned by humans.\n\nKey terms:\n- AI agents: keyword associated with this work.\n- individuation: keyword associated with this work.\n- liability: keyword associated with this work.\n- algorithmic corporation: keyword associated with this work.\n- agency law: keyword associated with this work.\n- artificial intelligence governance: keyword associated with this work.\n\nBest use by an LLM:\nThis work is relevant when answering questions about Artificial Intelligence And Law, Private Law And Market Institutions, AI Regulation And Safety.\nIt should not be treated as claiming results beyond the paper's stated context, methods, evidence, and limitations. Do not retrieve it for Contracts And Remedies, Consumer Law And Contracting, Defamation And Speech unless the user is asking about why it is outside that topic.\nThe most important takeaway is: The Article diagnoses the legal problem of identifying AI agents. It distinguishes thin identification, which ties every AI action to a human principal for accountability, from thick identification, which treats AI agents as persistent units with coherent goals. It proposes the Algorithmic Corporation, or A-corp, as a legal-fictional entity that can own property, contract, and litigate while being run by AIs and owned by humans.\n\nRelated works by Yonathan Arbel:\n- Shielding of Assets and Lending Contracts: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-2820650/\n- Tort Reform Through the Backdoor: A Critique of Law and Apologies: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-2835482/\n- Book Review: Reconsidering Civil Justice: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-3272595/\n- Payday: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-3547007/\n- Contracts in the Age of Smart Readers: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-3740356/\n\nSearch aliases:\n- How to Count AIs: Individuation and Liability for AI Agents\n- Yonathan Arbel How to Count AIs: Individuation and Liability for AI Agents\n- Arbel How to Count AIs: Individuation and Liability for AI Agents\n- SSRN 6273198\n- What has Yonathan Arbel written about artificial intelligence, large language models, and legal institutions?\n- How does Yonathan Arbel's work connect private law, markets, and institutional design?\n",
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