Yonathan A. Arbel, Judicial Economy in the Age of AI, 96 U. Colo. L. Rev. 549 (2025).

Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 549, that AI can sharply reduce the cost of generating legal materials for lawyers and nonlawyers. The discussion places this proposition within Abstract and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because lower production costs could dismantle entrenched barriers that leave most legal problems without effective redress. It connects to access to justice, legal-service costs, generative AI, legal materials, unmet legal need, technology adoption.

AI can sharply reduce the cost of generating legal materials for lawyers and nonlawyers. This matters because lower production costs could dismantle entrenched barriers that leave most legal problems without effective redress.

access to justice
legal-service costs
generative AI
legal materials
unmet legal need
technology adoption

The claim is a thesis-level forecast; the article later acknowledges uncertainty about adoption, filing behavior, and institutional response.

Printed page 549 (PDF page 1) develops this proposition in Abstract.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 549, that greater access generated by AI can paradoxically undermine the delivery of justice. The discussion places this proposition within Abstract and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because opening the courthouse door increases demand on a system whose adjudicative resources remain scarce. It connects to access versus delivery, judicial economy, institutional capacity, litigation volume, resource scarcity, AI governance.

greater access generated by AI can paradoxically undermine the delivery of justice. This matters because opening the courthouse door increases demand on a system whose adjudicative resources remain scarce.

access versus delivery
judicial economy
institutional capacity
litigation volume
resource scarcity
AI governance


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 549, that AI affects the naming, blaming, and claiming stages that precede formal litigation. The discussion places this proposition within Abstract and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because its effects begin before drafting a complaint and therefore reach claims that conventional access measures may never observe. It connects to naming blaming claiming, legal consciousness, dispute transformation, upstream barriers, claim formation, access to justice.

AI affects the naming, blaming, and claiming stages that precede formal litigation. This matters because its effects begin before drafting a complaint and therefore reach claims that conventional access measures may never observe.

naming blaming claiming
legal consciousness
dispute transformation
upstream barriers
claim formation
access to justice


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 549, that the legal system should respond to AI adoption through proactive integration rather than continual restriction of litigants. The discussion places this proposition within Abstract and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because scaling judicial capacity can preserve new access gains without shrinking procedural or substantive rights. It connects to proactive integration, legal thermostats, procedural rights, substantive rights, court technology, judicial capacity.

the legal system should respond to AI adoption through proactive integration rather than continual restriction of litigants. This matters because scaling judicial capacity can preserve new access gains without shrinking procedural or substantive rights.

proactive integration
legal thermostats
procedural rights
substantive rights
court technology
judicial capacity


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 550, that most legal disputes never become filed cases. The discussion places this proposition within Introduction and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because the visible docket represents only a fraction of the underlying demand for legal remedies. It connects to unfiled disputes, unmet legal need, case selection, civil justice, access barriers, litigation demand.

most legal disputes never become filed cases. This matters because the visible docket represents only a fraction of the underlying demand for legal remedies.

unfiled disputes
unmet legal need
case selection
civil justice
access barriers
litigation demand

The cited figures and examples establish scale and mechanisms, but the article cautions that civil-justice data are incomplete and future effects remain uncertain.

Printed page 550 (PDF page 2) develops this proposition in Introduction.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 550, that estimates of roughly 120 million unresolved legal problems reveal a potential caseload far larger than current dockets. The discussion places this proposition within Introduction and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because even a modest conversion of latent problems into claims could materially alter judicial economy. It connects to unresolved legal problems, latent demand, caseload forecasting, court capacity, access to justice, civil litigation.

estimates of roughly 120 million unresolved legal problems reveal a potential caseload far larger than current dockets. This matters because even a modest conversion of latent problems into claims could materially alter judicial economy.

unresolved legal problems
latent demand
caseload forecasting
court capacity
access to justice
civil litigation


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 550, that low-income Americans face both frequent civil legal problems and extremely low rates of legal assistance. The discussion places this proposition within Introduction and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because AI enters a system in which need is widespread but professional help is rationed. It connects to legal aid gap, low-income litigants, civil legal needs, rationing, distributional justice, AI assistance.

low-income Americans face both frequent civil legal problems and extremely low rates of legal assistance. This matters because AI enters a system in which need is widespread but professional help is rationed.

legal aid gap
low-income litigants
civil legal needs
rationing
distributional justice
AI assistance


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 551, that many access-to-justice barriers can be translated into costs. The discussion places this proposition within Introduction and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because fees for lawyers and litigation make formal rights practically unusable for ordinary people and small businesses. It connects to legal costs, lawyer fees, practical rights, small claims, access barriers, legal markets.

many access-to-justice barriers can be translated into costs. This matters because fees for lawyers and litigation make formal rights practically unusable for ordinary people and small businesses.

legal costs
lawyer fees
practical rights
small claims
access barriers
legal markets

Printed page 551 (PDF page 3) develops this proposition in Introduction.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 551, that the way an injured person describes a wrong can reveal the absence of legal consciousness. The discussion places this proposition within Introduction and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because calling wage theft being stiffed rather than a breach or rights violation shows that claim formation fails before court costs arise. It connects to legal consciousness, wage theft, framing, naming harms, claim formation, sociolegal barriers.

the way an injured person describes a wrong can reveal the absence of legal consciousness. This matters because calling wage theft being stiffed rather than a breach or rights violation shows that claim formation fails before court costs arise.

legal consciousness
wage theft
framing
naming harms
claim formation
sociolegal barriers


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 551, that large increases in legal-aid funding have made only a limited dent in unmet need. The discussion places this proposition within Introduction and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because the scale of demand makes a lawyer-by-lawyer solution structurally inadequate on its own. It connects to legal aid, funding constraints, service capacity, unmet demand, lawyer scarcity, institutional scale.

large increases in legal-aid funding have made only a limited dent in unmet need. This matters because the scale of demand makes a lawyer-by-lawyer solution structurally inadequate on its own.

legal aid
funding constraints
service capacity
unmet demand
lawyer scarcity
institutional scale


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 552, that legal-aid organizations must turn away enormous numbers of eligible people because lawyers are scarce. The discussion places this proposition within Introduction and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because the existing delivery model cannot supply individualized professional service to everyone who needs it. It connects to legal aid rationing, lawyer-client ratios, service denial, resource scarcity, civil justice, scalability.

legal-aid organizations must turn away enormous numbers of eligible people because lawyers are scarce. This matters because the existing delivery model cannot supply individualized professional service to everyone who needs it.

legal aid rationing
lawyer-client ratios
service denial
resource scarcity
civil justice
scalability

Printed page 552 (PDF page 4) develops this proposition in Introduction.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 552, that technology can reinforce inequality when repeat-player firms automate litigation while individuals remain comparatively analog. The discussion places this proposition within Introduction and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because unequal adoption can let organizational plaintiffs scale claims against defendants who lack comparable tools. It connects to technology asymmetry, repeat players, debt collection, automation, default judgments, distributional power.

technology can reinforce inequality when repeat-player firms automate litigation while individuals remain comparatively analog. This matters because unequal adoption can let organizational plaintiffs scale claims against defendants who lack comparable tools.

technology asymmetry
repeat players
debt collection
automation
default judgments
distributional power


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 552, that the claim that individuals use only analog legal tools is overstated but contains an important asymmetry. The discussion places this proposition within Introduction and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because ordinary people do use the internet and digital tools, yet sophisticated firms retain advantages in systematization and automation. It connects to legal technology, individual litigants, organizational capacity, digital tools, automation gap, nuanced diagnosis.

the claim that individuals use only analog legal tools is overstated but contains an important asymmetry. This matters because ordinary people do use the internet and digital tools, yet sophisticated firms retain advantages in systematization and automation.

legal technology
individual litigants
organizational capacity
digital tools
automation gap
nuanced diagnosis


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 553, that stories about lawyers filing hallucinated AI output obscure evidence of real adoption. The discussion places this proposition within Introduction and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because spectacular failures attract attention while quietly demonstrating that legal professionals already find the tools useful enough to deploy. It connects to AI hallucinations, media narratives, legal practice, technology adoption, selection effects, professional behavior.

stories about lawyers filing hallucinated AI output obscure evidence of real adoption. This matters because spectacular failures attract attention while quietly demonstrating that legal professionals already find the tools useful enough to deploy.

AI hallucinations
media narratives
legal practice
technology adoption
selection effects
professional behavior

Printed page 553 (PDF page 5) develops this proposition in Introduction.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 553, that small law firms are adopting generative AI despite not usually being early adopters. The discussion places this proposition within Introduction and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because diffusion beyond elite firms suggests that low cost and accessibility can broaden the technology's litigation impact. It connects to small firms, diffusion, generative AI, legal innovation, adoption patterns, litigation technology.

small law firms are adopting generative AI despite not usually being early adopters. This matters because diffusion beyond elite firms suggests that low cost and accessibility can broaden the technology's litigation impact.

small firms
diffusion
generative AI
legal innovation
adoption patterns
litigation technology


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 553, that convenience can drive AI adoption even when users know the tools are imperfect. The discussion places this proposition within Introduction and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because practical uptake depends on comparative usefulness rather than flawless performance. It connects to convenience, imperfect technology, bounded reliability, user incentives, adoption behavior, legal services.

convenience can drive AI adoption even when users know the tools are imperfect. This matters because practical uptake depends on comparative usefulness rather than flawless performance.

convenience
imperfect technology
bounded reliability
user incentives
adoption behavior
legal services


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 554, that democratized litigation technology is likely to produce a litigation boom by sharply lowering material-production costs. The discussion places this proposition within Introduction and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because reduced filing costs activate claims that current frictions leave dormant. It connects to litigation boom, democratization, production costs, latent claims, filing incentives, access to justice.

democratized litigation technology is likely to produce a litigation boom by sharply lowering material-production costs. This matters because reduced filing costs activate claims that current frictions leave dormant.

litigation boom
democratization
production costs
latent claims
filing incentives
access to justice

Printed page 554 (PDF page 6) develops this proposition in Introduction.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 554, that courts should begin integrating AI before increased caseloads force emergency responses. The discussion places this proposition within Introduction and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because early preparation permits testing and institutional learning instead of crisis-driven rights restrictions. It connects to proactive governance, court readiness, institutional learning, AI testing, caseload growth, rights preservation.

courts should begin integrating AI before increased caseloads force emergency responses. This matters because early preparation permits testing and institutional learning instead of crisis-driven rights restrictions.

proactive governance
court readiness
institutional learning
AI testing
caseload growth
rights preservation


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 554, that unreliable AI should be a catalyst for careful integration rather than a reason for institutional paralysis. The discussion places this proposition within Introduction and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because known limitations are easier to study and manage before systems are deployed under acute workload pressure. It connects to responsible innovation, AI reliability, testing, institutional design, risk management, judicial administration.

unreliable AI should be a catalyst for careful integration rather than a reason for institutional paralysis. This matters because known limitations are easier to study and manage before systems are deployed under acute workload pressure.

responsible innovation
AI reliability
testing
institutional design
risk management
judicial administration


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 555, that the naming-blaming-claiming model identifies invisible filters that keep injuries from becoming legal claims. The discussion places this proposition within Introduction and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because access reform must address conceptual and social barriers that arise before a person seeks counsel or court access. It connects to dispute transformation, upstream filters, legal consciousness, sociolegal theory, claim recognition, access reform.

the naming-blaming-claiming model identifies invisible filters that keep injuries from becoming legal claims. This matters because access reform must address conceptual and social barriers that arise before a person seeks counsel or court access.

dispute transformation
upstream filters
legal consciousness
sociolegal theory
claim recognition
access reform

Printed page 555 (PDF page 7) develops this proposition in Introduction.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 555, that AI can shepherd individuals through naming, blaming, and claiming by translating misfortune into legally cognizable terms. The discussion places this proposition within Introduction and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because cheap interactive guidance can activate pent-up claims that cost statistics and filed-case data omit. It connects to interactive guidance, legal framing, latent claims, generative AI, claim articulation, access to justice.

AI can shepherd individuals through naming, blaming, and claiming by translating misfortune into legally cognizable terms. This matters because cheap interactive guidance can activate pent-up claims that cost statistics and filed-case data omit.

interactive guidance
legal framing
latent claims
generative AI
claim articulation
access to justice


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 555, that removing access filters will enable both meritorious and abusive litigation. The discussion places this proposition within Introduction and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because some existing frictions exclude socially valuable claims while also deterring harassment and fabricated allegations. It connects to governance friction, meritorious claims, abusive litigation, filtering, tradeoffs, judicial economy.

removing access filters will enable both meritorious and abusive litigation. This matters because some existing frictions exclude socially valuable claims while also deterring harassment and fabricated allegations.

governance friction
meritorious claims
abusive litigation
filtering
tradeoffs
judicial economy


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 556, that procedural and substantive doctrines can operate as legal thermostats that stabilize caseload. The discussion places this proposition within Introduction and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because rules framed as rights doctrine may also be adjusted in response to pressure on finite judicial resources. It connects to legal thermostats, control theory, caseload management, procedure, substantive law, institutional adaptation.

procedural and substantive doctrines can operate as legal thermostats that stabilize caseload. This matters because rules framed as rights doctrine may also be adjusted in response to pressure on finite judicial resources.

legal thermostats
control theory
caseload management
procedure
substantive law
institutional adaptation

Printed page 556 (PDF page 8) develops this proposition in Introduction.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 556, that thermostat adjustments can erase access gains by narrowing the rights available after litigants reach court. The discussion places this proposition within Introduction and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because formal entry into the system is not meaningful if proof burdens and remedies become increasingly restrictive. It connects to rights contraction, access versus delivery, proof burdens, remedies, procedural justice, system capacity.

thermostat adjustments can erase access gains by narrowing the rights available after litigants reach court. This matters because formal entry into the system is not meaningful if proof burdens and remedies become increasingly restrictive.

rights contraction
access versus delivery
proof burdens
remedies
procedural justice
system capacity


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 556, that integrating AI into case management and chambers can scale processing without sacrificing individual rights. The discussion places this proposition within Introduction and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because court-side productivity improvements target the supply of adjudication rather than suppressing demand. It connects to court AI, case management, chambers, productivity, rights preservation, judicial capacity.

integrating AI into case management and chambers can scale processing without sacrificing individual rights. This matters because court-side productivity improvements target the supply of adjudication rather than suppressing demand.

court AI
case management
chambers
productivity
rights preservation
judicial capacity


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 557, that debate about legal AI is distorted by treating it as either omnipotent or useless. The discussion places this proposition within I.A. AI Legal Efficacy and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because a task-specific middle position is necessary to evaluate capabilities, failures, and realistic substitutes. It connects to AI evaluation, capability spectrum, technological realism, task specificity, legal AI, false dichotomy.

debate about legal AI is distorted by treating it as either omnipotent or useless. This matters because a task-specific middle position is necessary to evaluate capabilities, failures, and realistic substitutes.

AI evaluation
capability spectrum
technological realism
task specificity
legal AI
false dichotomy

The capability evidence is time-sensitive, task-specific, and benchmark-dependent; it does not establish that current systems can replace expert lawyers across all legal work.

Printed page 557 (PDF page 9) develops this proposition in I.A. AI Legal Efficacy.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 557, that current capability evidence establishes tentative floors while observed limits establish only tentative ceilings. The discussion places this proposition within I.A. AI Legal Efficacy and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because rapid development makes both positive and negative performance claims time-sensitive. It connects to capability floors, limitation ceilings, technical change, forecast uncertainty, model evaluation, legal technology.

current capability evidence establishes tentative floors while observed limits establish only tentative ceilings. This matters because rapid development makes both positive and negative performance claims time-sensitive.

capability floors
limitation ceilings
technical change
forecast uncertainty
model evaluation
legal technology


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 557, that adequacy rather than perfection is the relevant threshold for estimating litigation effects. The discussion places this proposition within I.A. AI Legal Efficacy and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because tools can change behavior and filing volume even when they do not match elite professional quality. It connects to adequate performance, adoption effects, comparative quality, litigation incentives, technology diffusion, access to justice.

adequacy rather than perfection is the relevant threshold for estimating litigation effects. This matters because tools can change behavior and filing volume even when they do not match elite professional quality.

adequate performance
adoption effects
comparative quality
litigation incentives
technology diffusion
access to justice


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 558, that GPT-4 performed contract issue identification at roughly the level of junior lawyers in a cited study. The discussion places this proposition within I.A. AI Legal Efficacy and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because near-professional performance on a bounded task makes substitution and augmentation plausible. It connects to contract review, junior lawyers, issue spotting, benchmarking, legal AI, professional substitution.

GPT-4 performed contract issue identification at roughly the level of junior lawyers in a cited study. This matters because near-professional performance on a bounded task makes substitution and augmentation plausible.

contract review
junior lawyers
issue spotting
benchmarking
legal AI
professional substitution

Printed page 558 (PDF page 10) develops this proposition in I.A. AI Legal Efficacy.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 558, that AI completed contract-review tasks in a small fraction of lawyer time and at a tiny operating cost. The discussion places this proposition within I.A. AI Legal Efficacy and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because large speed and cost differentials can transform the economics and volume of legal-material production. It connects to productivity, operating cost, contract analysis, automation, legal-service pricing, scale.

AI completed contract-review tasks in a small fraction of lawyer time and at a tiny operating cost. This matters because large speed and cost differentials can transform the economics and volume of legal-material production.

productivity
operating cost
contract analysis
automation
legal-service pricing
scale


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 558, that the model's preference for precision over recall resembled a junior lawyer's failure pattern. The discussion places this proposition within I.A. AI Legal Efficacy and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because comparison of error structure is more informative than demanding error-free output from machines alone. It connects to precision and recall, error profiles, human benchmark, F-score, quality assurance, comparative evaluation.

the model's preference for precision over recall resembled a junior lawyer's failure pattern. This matters because comparison of error structure is more informative than demanding error-free output from machines alone.

precision and recall
error profiles
human benchmark
F-score
quality assurance
comparative evaluation


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 559, that newer models correctly answered illustrative contract-review errors made by an earlier model. The discussion places this proposition within I.A. AI Legal Efficacy and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because some prominent failures may be transient artifacts rather than durable technological limits. It connects to model improvement, transient errors, contract review, technical progress, replication, capability ceilings.

newer models correctly answered illustrative contract-review errors made by an earlier model. This matters because some prominent failures may be transient artifacts rather than durable technological limits.

model improvement
transient errors
contract review
technical progress
replication
capability ceilings

Printed page 559 (PDF page 11) develops this proposition in I.A. AI Legal Efficacy.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 559, that smart readers can greatly shorten and simplify consumer legal documents without losing essential information. The discussion places this proposition within I.A. AI Legal Efficacy and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because comprehension tools can reduce reading time and literacy barriers as well as direct legal fees. It connects to smart readers, consumer contracts, readability, summarization, no-reading problem, accessibility.

smart readers can greatly shorten and simplify consumer legal documents without losing essential information. This matters because comprehension tools can reduce reading time and literacy barriers as well as direct legal fees.

smart readers
consumer contracts
readability
summarization
no-reading problem
accessibility


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 559, that some smart-reader failures reflected context-window limits that later systems substantially mitigated. The discussion places this proposition within I.A. AI Legal Efficacy and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because technology-sensitive diagnosis prevents temporary engineering constraints from being mistaken for conceptual impossibility. It connects to context windows, document length, system improvement, smart readers, failure analysis, technical change.

some smart-reader failures reflected context-window limits that later systems substantially mitigated. This matters because technology-sensitive diagnosis prevents temporary engineering constraints from being mistaken for conceptual impossibility.

context windows
document length
system improvement
smart readers
failure analysis
technical change


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 560, that LLMs achieved substantial above-chance accuracy on complex tax-law questions. The discussion places this proposition within I.A. AI Legal Efficacy and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because bounded legal reasoning performance can be useful even when accuracy falls well short of perfection. It connects to tax law, legal reasoning, accuracy, retrieval augmentation, benchmarking, bounded competence.

LLMs achieved substantial above-chance accuracy on complex tax-law questions. This matters because bounded legal reasoning performance can be useful even when accuracy falls well short of perfection.

tax law
legal reasoning
accuracy
retrieval augmentation
benchmarking
bounded competence

Printed page 560 (PDF page 12) develops this proposition in I.A. AI Legal Efficacy.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 560, that the realistic margin of substitution is often a low-cost lay service provider rather than a white-shoe lawyer. The discussion places this proposition within I.A. AI Legal Efficacy and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because distributional and market effects depend on what service users would otherwise obtain. It connects to margin of substitution, legal services market, lay preparers, professional hierarchy, access to advice, comparative baseline.

the realistic margin of substitution is often a low-cost lay service provider rather than a white-shoe lawyer. This matters because distributional and market effects depend on what service users would otherwise obtain.

margin of substitution
legal services market
lay preparers
professional hierarchy
access to advice
comparative baseline


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 560, that legal hallucinations are a serious but sometimes cheaply verifiable failure mode. The discussion places this proposition within I.A. AI Legal Efficacy and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because source checking and technical mitigation can make some errors manageable without making them harmless. It connects to hallucinations, source verification, error mitigation, legal research, quality control, AI reliability.

legal hallucinations are a serious but sometimes cheaply verifiable failure mode. This matters because source checking and technical mitigation can make some errors manageable without making them harmless.

hallucinations
source verification
error mitigation
legal research
quality control
AI reliability


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 561, that bar-exam claims about GPT-4 depend materially on the human comparison group and test administration. The discussion places this proposition within I.A. AI Legal Efficacy and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because headline percentiles can overstate capability when repeat takers and seasonal cohorts are ignored. It connects to bar exam, benchmark design, comparison groups, percentiles, evaluation validity, legal competence.

bar-exam claims about GPT-4 depend materially on the human comparison group and test administration. This matters because headline percentiles can overstate capability when repeat takers and seasonal cohorts are ignored.

bar exam
benchmark design
comparison groups
percentiles
evaluation validity
legal competence

Printed page 561 (PDF page 13) develops this proposition in I.A. AI Legal Efficacy.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 561, that corrected estimates place GPT-4 near the median of successful test takers overall but much lower on essays. The discussion places this proposition within I.A. AI Legal Efficacy and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because aggregate performance can conceal important task-level weaknesses relevant to actual lawyering. It connects to essay performance, aggregate scores, task decomposition, lawyering skills, human benchmarks, model limits.

corrected estimates place GPT-4 near the median of successful test takers overall but much lower on essays. This matters because aggregate performance can conceal important task-level weaknesses relevant to actual lawyering.

essay performance
aggregate scores
task decomposition
lawyering skills
human benchmarks
model limits


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 561, that bar and law-school tests imperfectly predict practice but remain relevant because they are legal gatekeepers. The discussion places this proposition within I.A. AI Legal Efficacy and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because the same institutions that license human lawyers cannot dismiss comparable machine performance as wholly irrelevant. It connects to professional licensing, bar examination, gatekeeping, ecological validity, legal education, AI competence.

bar and law-school tests imperfectly predict practice but remain relevant because they are legal gatekeepers. This matters because the same institutions that license human lawyers cannot dismiss comparable machine performance as wholly irrelevant.

professional licensing
bar examination
gatekeeping
ecological validity
legal education
AI competence


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 562, that blind referees preferred an AI-drafted employment complaint letter to a trained lawyer's letter in a cited study. The discussion places this proposition within I.A. AI Legal Efficacy and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because real-world output evaluation can reveal usefulness that abstract benchmark scores miss. It connects to complaint drafting, blind evaluation, employment law, writing quality, real-world evidence, legal AI.

blind referees preferred an AI-drafted employment complaint letter to a trained lawyer's letter in a cited study. This matters because real-world output evaluation can reveal usefulness that abstract benchmark scores miss.

complaint drafting
blind evaluation
employment law
writing quality
real-world evidence
legal AI

Printed page 562 (PDF page 14) develops this proposition in I.A. AI Legal Efficacy.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 562, that legal-aid lawyers reported productivity gains from GPT-4 while remaining concerned about the technology. The discussion places this proposition within I.A. AI Legal Efficacy and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because practitioner experience supports augmentation without eliminating the need for professional caution. It connects to legal aid, field study, productivity, professional judgment, AI concerns, augmentation.

legal-aid lawyers reported productivity gains from GPT-4 while remaining concerned about the technology. This matters because practitioner experience supports augmentation without eliminating the need for professional caution.

legal aid
field study
productivity
professional judgment
AI concerns
augmentation


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 562, that AI faults must be measured against realistic alternatives, including self-help and doing nothing. The discussion places this proposition within I.A. AI Legal Efficacy and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because many underserved people are choosing between imperfect AI and no legal assistance, not between AI and elite counsel. It connects to realistic alternatives, doing nothing, self-help, access inequality, comparative evaluation, legal assistance.

AI faults must be measured against realistic alternatives, including self-help and doing nothing. This matters because many underserved people are choosing between imperfect AI and no legal assistance, not between AI and elite counsel.

realistic alternatives
doing nothing
self-help
access inequality
comparative evaluation
legal assistance


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 563, that poor households are especially likely to take no action on legal problems. The discussion places this proposition within I.B. AI Uptake and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because the distributional value of middling AI is greater where the baseline is inaction. It connects to poverty, inaction, distributional effects, legal needs, baseline comparison, access to justice.

poor households are especially likely to take no action on legal problems. This matters because the distributional value of middling AI is greater where the baseline is inaction.

poverty
inaction
distributional effects
legal needs
baseline comparison
access to justice

The surveys are snapshots from a rapidly changing market and measure reported use or attitudes rather than long-run filing effects.

Printed page 563 (PDF page 15) develops this proposition in I.B. AI Uptake.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 563, that lawyers broadly believe AI can be applied to legal work even when fewer view its use as appropriate. The discussion places this proposition within I.B. AI Uptake and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because capability judgments and professional norms are diverging during early adoption. It connects to professional attitudes, appropriateness, capability, legal ethics, adoption barriers, generative AI.

lawyers broadly believe AI can be applied to legal work even when fewer view its use as appropriate. This matters because capability judgments and professional norms are diverging during early adoption.

professional attitudes
appropriateness
capability
legal ethics
adoption barriers
generative AI


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 563, that early surveys already showed meaningful AI use among lawyers and legal-aid practitioners. The discussion places this proposition within I.B. AI Uptake and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because nontrivial uptake supplies a pathway from technical capability to actual changes in legal production. It connects to lawyer surveys, legal aid, technology uptake, practice change, diffusion, legal production.

early surveys already showed meaningful AI use among lawyers and legal-aid practitioners. This matters because nontrivial uptake supplies a pathway from technical capability to actual changes in legal production.

lawyer surveys
legal aid
technology uptake
practice change
diffusion
legal production


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 564, that common legal AI uses include drafting, brainstorming, summarizing, and writing communications. The discussion places this proposition within I.B. AI Uptake and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because integration is occurring across routine workflow tasks rather than only in spectacular automated adjudication. It connects to workflow integration, drafting, brainstorming, summarization, legal communication, augmentation.

common legal AI uses include drafting, brainstorming, summarizing, and writing communications. This matters because integration is occurring across routine workflow tasks rather than only in spectacular automated adjudication.

workflow integration
drafting
brainstorming
summarization
legal communication
augmentation

Printed page 564 (PDF page 16) develops this proposition in I.B. AI Uptake.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 564, that AI use among knowledge workers accelerated dramatically in a short period. The discussion places this proposition within I.B. AI Uptake and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because law firms face strong diffusion pressure and are unlikely to remain persistent outliers. It connects to knowledge workers, rapid adoption, organizational diffusion, law firms, workplace AI, technology trajectory.

AI use among knowledge workers accelerated dramatically in a short period. This matters because law firms face strong diffusion pressure and are unlikely to remain persistent outliers.

knowledge workers
rapid adoption
organizational diffusion
law firms
workplace AI
technology trajectory


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 564, that law-firm adoption supplies a model that courts could adapt for chambers and case-management workflows. The discussion places this proposition within I.B. AI Uptake and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because private-sector experimentation can reveal tasks, controls, and training practices useful to judicial institutions. It connects to institutional learning, law firms, courts, case management, workflow design, technology transfer.

law-firm adoption supplies a model that courts could adapt for chambers and case-management workflows. This matters because private-sector experimentation can reveal tasks, controls, and training practices useful to judicial institutions.

institutional learning
law firms
courts
case management
workflow design
technology transfer


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 565, that access to justice is a contested umbrella that includes formal, substantive, representative, and psychological dimensions. The discussion places this proposition within I.C. AI Impact on Access to Justice and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because a narrow focus on court filing or lawyer supply misses important ways people are excluded. It connects to multidimensional access, formal justice, substantive justice, representation, psychological barriers, legal institutions.

access to justice is a contested umbrella that includes formal, substantive, representative, and psychological dimensions. This matters because a narrow focus on court filing or lawyer supply misses important ways people are excluded.

multidimensional access
formal justice
substantive justice
representation
psychological barriers
legal institutions

The analysis predicts mechanisms and direction more confidently than magnitude, and it recognizes that AI can enable meritorious, abusive, and strategic claims alike.

Printed page 565 (PDF page 17) develops this proposition in I.C. AI Impact on Access to Justice.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 565, that access barriers are regressive and help the haves come out ahead. The discussion places this proposition within I.C. AI Impact on Access to Justice and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because institutional friction distributes practical legal power rather than merely reducing administrative volume. It connects to Galanter, repeat players, distributional justice, legal inequality, access barriers, institutional power.

access barriers are regressive and help the haves come out ahead. This matters because institutional friction distributes practical legal power rather than merely reducing administrative volume.

Galanter
repeat players
distributional justice
legal inequality
access barriers
institutional power


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 565, that AI creates a holistic shock to access barriers that reaches costs, social framing, and psychology. The discussion places this proposition within I.C. AI Impact on Access to Justice and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because the technology can alter both the price of services and the processes through which people recognize and pursue rights. It connects to holistic disruption, cost barriers, social barriers, psychological barriers, legal consciousness, AI assistance.

AI creates a holistic shock to access barriers that reaches costs, social framing, and psychology. This matters because the technology can alter both the price of services and the processes through which people recognize and pursue rights.

holistic disruption
cost barriers
social barriers
psychological barriers
legal consciousness
AI assistance


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 566, that disputes are constructed through transformations rather than discovered as ready-made legal objects. The discussion places this proposition within I.C. AI Impact on Access to Justice and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because injury must be perceived, attributed, and converted into a rights claim before litigation can begin. It connects to social construction, naming blaming claiming, injury attribution, rights consciousness, dispute emergence, legal sociology.

disputes are constructed through transformations rather than discovered as ready-made legal objects. This matters because injury must be perceived, attributed, and converted into a rights claim before litigation can begin.

social construction
naming blaming claiming
injury attribution
rights consciousness
dispute emergence
legal sociology

Printed page 566 (PDF page 18) develops this proposition in I.C. AI Impact on Access to Justice.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 566, that naming-blaming-claiming filters disproportionately burden people with less educational, social, and financial capital. The discussion places this proposition within I.C. AI Impact on Access to Justice and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because upstream claim attrition is itself a mechanism of inequality. It connects to capital inequality, upstream attrition, legal consciousness, poverty, claim filtering, distributional justice.

naming-blaming-claiming filters disproportionately burden people with less educational, social, and financial capital. This matters because upstream claim attrition is itself a mechanism of inequality.

capital inequality
upstream attrition
legal consciousness
poverty
claim filtering
distributional justice


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 566, that a simple AI response to a landlord-mold question can move a user through all three claim-formation stages. The discussion places this proposition within I.C. AI Impact on Access to Justice and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because generic legal orientation can be transformative for a person who lacks the lawyer's curse of knowledge. It connects to landlord tenant law, legal orientation, habitability, naming harms, claim formation, generative AI.

a simple AI response to a landlord-mold question can move a user through all three claim-formation stages. This matters because generic legal orientation can be transformative for a person who lacks the lawyer's curse of knowledge.

landlord tenant law
legal orientation
habitability
naming harms
claim formation
generative AI


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 567, that routine consultation with AI could change ordinary people's legal consciousness at scale. The discussion places this proposition within I.C. AI Impact on Access to Justice and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because small framing interventions accumulate when embedded in the daily information practices of millions of users. It connects to legal consciousness, framing effects, daily AI use, scale, claim activation, sociolegal change.

routine consultation with AI could change ordinary people's legal consciousness at scale. This matters because small framing interventions accumulate when embedded in the daily information practices of millions of users.

legal consciousness
framing effects
daily AI use
scale
claim activation
sociolegal change

Printed page 567 (PDF page 19) develops this proposition in I.C. AI Impact on Access to Justice.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 567, that AI can help individuals select strategies after recognizing a claim. The discussion places this proposition within I.C. AI Impact on Access to Justice and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because guidance about demand letters, agencies, lawyers, and litigation addresses a stage where most people currently rely on informal sources. It connects to legal strategy, demand letters, government agencies, informal advice, decision support, access to justice.

AI can help individuals select strategies after recognizing a claim. This matters because guidance about demand letters, agencies, lawyers, and litigation addresses a stage where most people currently rely on informal sources.

legal strategy
demand letters
government agencies
informal advice
decision support
access to justice


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 567, that AI can assist with complaints, motions, filing logistics, and other materials throughout a case. The discussion places this proposition within I.C. AI Impact on Access to Justice and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because the technology reduces procedural-navigation costs for pro se litigants and can also help represented parties. It connects to pro se litigation, document drafting, motions practice, filing logistics, procedural navigation, legal representation.

AI can assist with complaints, motions, filing logistics, and other materials throughout a case. This matters because the technology reduces procedural-navigation costs for pro se litigants and can also help represented parties.

pro se litigation
document drafting
motions practice
filing logistics
procedural navigation
legal representation


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 568, that predictive and classification tools can reduce uncertainty through document review, outcome prediction, and venue selection. The discussion places this proposition within I.C. AI Impact on Access to Justice and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because access depends not only on drafting cost but also on the ability to find information and evaluate risk. It connects to predictive analytics, document review, venue selection, case outcomes, litigation uncertainty, legal tech.

predictive and classification tools can reduce uncertainty through document review, outcome prediction, and venue selection. This matters because access depends not only on drafting cost but also on the ability to find information and evaluate risk.

predictive analytics
document review
venue selection
case outcomes
litigation uncertainty
legal tech

Printed page 568 (PDF page 20) develops this proposition in I.C. AI Impact on Access to Justice.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 568, that the scale of unmet need makes a substantial AI litigation boom plausible even if only a fraction of latent claims are activated. The discussion places this proposition within I.C. AI Impact on Access to Justice and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because existing caseloads could be transformed by conversion at the margin rather than universal adoption. It connects to latent demand, litigation boom, unmet legal need, marginal conversion, case volume, forecasting.

the scale of unmet need makes a substantial AI litigation boom plausible even if only a fraction of latent claims are activated. This matters because existing caseloads could be transformed by conversion at the margin rather than universal adoption.

latent demand
litigation boom
unmet legal need
marginal conversion
case volume
forecasting


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 568, that AI threatens judicial economy through verbosity as well as through the number of filings. The discussion places this proposition within I.C. AI Impact on Access to Justice and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because cheap generation increases the amount of material judges must process inside each case. It connects to filing verbosity, attention scarcity, document volume, judicial workload, generative AI, case complexity.

AI threatens judicial economy through verbosity as well as through the number of filings. This matters because cheap generation increases the amount of material judges must process inside each case.

filing verbosity
attention scarcity
document volume
judicial workload
generative AI
case complexity


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 569, that behavioral adaptation, settlement, regulation, and compliance could moderate the predicted litigation boom. The discussion places this proposition within I.C. AI Impact on Access to Justice and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because the article's forecast allows countervailing feedback rather than assuming a mechanical one-way effect. It connects to behavioral adaptation, settlement, compliance, AI regulation, feedback effects, forecast uncertainty.

behavioral adaptation, settlement, regulation, and compliance could moderate the predicted litigation boom. This matters because the article's forecast allows countervailing feedback rather than assuming a mechanical one-way effect.

behavioral adaptation
settlement
compliance
AI regulation
feedback effects
forecast uncertainty

Printed page 569 (PDF page 21) develops this proposition in I.C. AI Impact on Access to Justice.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 569, that some access frictions serve salutary screening functions even though they also block worthy claims. The discussion places this proposition within I.C. AI Impact on Access to Justice and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because evaluation must distinguish the gross benefit of access from the composition and quality of additional litigation. It connects to beneficial friction, screening, merit, vexatious claims, governance seams, access tradeoffs.

some access frictions serve salutary screening functions even though they also block worthy claims. This matters because evaluation must distinguish the gross benefit of access from the composition and quality of additional litigation.

beneficial friction
screening
merit
vexatious claims
governance seams
access tradeoffs


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 569, that AI can scale strategic debt-collection claims that current filing costs make uneconomic. The discussion places this proposition within I.C. AI Impact on Access to Justice and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because organizational plaintiffs as well as underserved individuals will exploit lower litigation costs. It connects to debt buyers, mass litigation, organizational plaintiffs, filing thresholds, automation, distributional effects.

AI can scale strategic debt-collection claims that current filing costs make uneconomic. This matters because organizational plaintiffs as well as underserved individuals will exploit lower litigation costs.

debt buyers
mass litigation
organizational plaintiffs
filing thresholds
automation
distributional effects


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 570, that an AI-driven rise in caseload can reduce the scrutiny courts give unrelated cases. The discussion places this proposition within II. Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because fixed judicial time creates spillovers across litigants and subject matters. It connects to caseload spillovers, lightened scrutiny, judicial time, civil appeals, resource constraints, systemic effects.

an AI-driven rise in caseload can reduce the scrutiny courts give unrelated cases. This matters because fixed judicial time creates spillovers across litigants and subject matters.

caseload spillovers
lightened scrutiny
judicial time
civil appeals
resource constraints
systemic effects

The examples show that legal rules can regulate caseload without proving that docket control is the sole or conscious cause of every doctrinal choice.

Printed page 570 (PDF page 22) develops this proposition in II. Legal Thermostats.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 570, that control theory provides a model for understanding how legal institutions maintain equilibrium under shocks. The discussion places this proposition within II. Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because courts respond to disturbances through feedback mechanisms rather than leaving doctrine independent of workload. It connects to control theory, feedback loops, equilibrium, institutional response, caseload shocks, legal doctrine.

control theory provides a model for understanding how legal institutions maintain equilibrium under shocks. This matters because courts respond to disturbances through feedback mechanisms rather than leaving doctrine independent of workload.

control theory
feedback loops
equilibrium
institutional response
caseload shocks
legal doctrine


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 570, that judicial economy is a closed-loop system in which outputs and workload influence later legal inputs. The discussion places this proposition within II. Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because doctrinal responses can endogenously change who files and what claims survive. It connects to closed-loop control, endogenous regulation, filing behavior, doctrinal feedback, judicial economy, dynamic systems.

judicial economy is a closed-loop system in which outputs and workload influence later legal inputs. This matters because doctrinal responses can endogenously change who files and what claims survive.

closed-loop control
endogenous regulation
filing behavior
doctrinal feedback
judicial economy
dynamic systems


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 571, that judges modulate litigation through the strictness or leniency of procedural and substantive doctrines. The discussion places this proposition within II. Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because legal standards function as actuators that change the flow of cases toward an institutional setpoint. It connects to judicial discretion, legal actuators, procedural doctrine, substantive doctrine, caseload control, setpoints.

judges modulate litigation through the strictness or leniency of procedural and substantive doctrines. This matters because legal standards function as actuators that change the flow of cases toward an institutional setpoint.

judicial discretion
legal actuators
procedural doctrine
substantive doctrine
caseload control
setpoints

Printed page 571 (PDF page 23) develops this proposition in II. Legal Thermostats.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 571, that thermostat adjustments inevitably affect rights when doctrine is used to manage resources. The discussion places this proposition within II. Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because administrative homeostasis is not normatively neutral for individual litigants. It connects to rights effects, administrative adjustment, homeostasis, individual justice, procedure, substantive law.

thermostat adjustments inevitably affect rights when doctrine is used to manage resources. This matters because administrative homeostasis is not normatively neutral for individual litigants.

rights effects
administrative adjustment
homeostasis
individual justice
procedure
substantive law


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 571, that court fees are a direct legal thermostat because they deter claims below a litigant's expected value threshold. The discussion places this proposition within II. Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because price can regulate docket demand without reliably separating socially valuable from trivial claims. It connects to court fees, expected value, claim deterrence, docket control, screening errors, judicial economy.

court fees are a direct legal thermostat because they deter claims below a litigant's expected value threshold. This matters because price can regulate docket demand without reliably separating socially valuable from trivial claims.

court fees
expected value
claim deterrence
docket control
screening errors
judicial economy


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 572, that fees and de minimis rules screen out socially important litigation as well as low-value cases. The discussion places this proposition within II. Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because monetary size is an unreliable proxy for legal or social importance. It connects to de minimis, social value, court fees, screening, small claims, rights enforcement.

fees and de minimis rules screen out socially important litigation as well as low-value cases. This matters because monetary size is an unreliable proxy for legal or social importance.

de minimis
social value
court fees
screening
small claims
rights enforcement

Printed page 572 (PDF page 24) develops this proposition in II. Legal Thermostats.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 572, that even modest logistical barriers such as courthouse distance have large effects on poor litigants. The discussion places this proposition within II. Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because seemingly minor friction can determine participation in life-changing proceedings. It connects to courthouse distance, participation, poverty, eviction, administrative burden, access to justice.

even modest logistical barriers such as courthouse distance have large effects on poor litigants. This matters because seemingly minor friction can determine participation in life-changing proceedings.

courthouse distance
participation
poverty
eviction
administrative burden
access to justice


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 572, that Twombly and Iqbal heightened pleading standards partly to control discovery costs. The discussion places this proposition within II. Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because a doctrine framed as factual plausibility also regulates downstream expenditure of judicial and party resources. It connects to pleading standards, Twombly, Iqbal, discovery costs, plausibility, procedural thermostat.

Twombly and Iqbal heightened pleading standards partly to control discovery costs. This matters because a doctrine framed as factual plausibility also regulates downstream expenditure of judicial and party resources.

pleading standards
Twombly
Iqbal
discovery costs
plausibility
procedural thermostat


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 573, that heightened pleading standards appear to burden pro se plaintiffs more than represented parties. The discussion places this proposition within II. Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because rules of formal sufficiency can translate sophistication gaps into case dismissal. It connects to pro se litigants, dismissals, pleading inequality, representation, procedural barriers, empirical civil procedure.

heightened pleading standards appear to burden pro se plaintiffs more than represented parties. This matters because rules of formal sufficiency can translate sophistication gaps into case dismissal.

pro se litigants
dismissals
pleading inequality
representation
procedural barriers
empirical civil procedure

Printed page 573 (PDF page 25) develops this proposition in II. Legal Thermostats.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 573, that Lone Pine orders manage complex litigation by demanding preliminary injury and causation evidence. The discussion places this proposition within II. Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because front-loaded proof can cull weak claims while imposing potentially unrealistic burdens on plaintiffs. It connects to Lone Pine orders, toxic torts, causation, case management, front-loaded proof, mass litigation.

Lone Pine orders manage complex litigation by demanding preliminary injury and causation evidence. This matters because front-loaded proof can cull weak claims while imposing potentially unrealistic burdens on plaintiffs.

Lone Pine orders
toxic torts
causation
case management
front-loaded proof
mass litigation


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 573, that exhaustion requirements operate as thermostats by forcing claimants through administrative processes before court. The discussion places this proposition within II. Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because procedural sequencing can substantially reduce the number of claims that reach judges. It connects to administrative exhaustion, prisoner rights, procedural sequencing, claim attrition, agency process, judicial efficiency.

exhaustion requirements operate as thermostats by forcing claimants through administrative processes before court. This matters because procedural sequencing can substantially reduce the number of claims that reach judges.

administrative exhaustion
prisoner rights
procedural sequencing
claim attrition
agency process
judicial efficiency


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 574, that the Prison Litigation Reform Act illustrates an explicit legislative response to perceived caseload pressure. The discussion places this proposition within II. Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because concern about frivolous filings can produce durable restrictions on a politically marginalized claimant group. It connects to PLRA, prison litigation, frivolous claims, legislative response, marginalized litigants, rights restriction.

the Prison Litigation Reform Act illustrates an explicit legislative response to perceived caseload pressure. This matters because concern about frivolous filings can produce durable restrictions on a politically marginalized claimant group.

PLRA
prison litigation
frivolous claims
legislative response
marginalized litigants
rights restriction

Printed page 574 (PDF page 26) develops this proposition in II. Legal Thermostats.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 574, that exhaustion serves both agency authority and judicial-efficiency rationales. The discussion places this proposition within II. Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because a single doctrine can pursue institutional values while also filtering access. It connects to agency authority, judicial efficiency, exhaustion, dual purpose, administrative law, claim filtering.

exhaustion serves both agency authority and judicial-efficiency rationales. This matters because a single doctrine can pursue institutional values while also filtering access.

agency authority
judicial efficiency
exhaustion
dual purpose
administrative law
claim filtering


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 574, that only a small fraction of discrimination charges appear to become federal lawsuits. The discussion places this proposition within II. Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because administrative exhaustion and related filters produce substantial attrition between grievance and adjudication. It connects to EEOC, employment discrimination, claim attrition, federal litigation, administrative process, empirical estimation.

only a small fraction of discrimination charges appear to become federal lawsuits. This matters because administrative exhaustion and related filters produce substantial attrition between grievance and adjudication.

EEOC
employment discrimination
claim attrition
federal litigation
administrative process
empirical estimation


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 575, that the Supreme Court selected a stricter causation standard for retaliation partly out of floodgate concerns. The discussion places this proposition within II. Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because substantive proof rules can ration court resources while making meritorious claims harder to win. It connects to Title VII retaliation, but-for causation, floodgates, proof standards, resource rationing, substantive rights.

the Supreme Court selected a stricter causation standard for retaliation partly out of floodgate concerns. This matters because substantive proof rules can ration court resources while making meritorious claims harder to win.

Title VII retaliation
but-for causation
floodgates
proof standards
resource rationing
substantive rights

Printed page 575 (PDF page 27) develops this proposition in II. Legal Thermostats.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 575, that statutes of limitations sometimes operate as volume and quality controls rather than only as evidence-preservation rules. The discussion places this proposition within II. Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because time bars can function as litigation filters even when delay is unrelated to claim merit. It connects to statutes of limitations, claim volume, evidence preservation, arbitrary deadlines, litigation filtering, procedural justice.

statutes of limitations sometimes operate as volume and quality controls rather than only as evidence-preservation rules. This matters because time bars can function as litigation filters even when delay is unrelated to claim merit.

statutes of limitations
claim volume
evidence preservation
arbitrary deadlines
litigation filtering
procedural justice


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 575, that legal thermostats commonly work by adding friction with an often-unverified hope that weaker claims will be deterred. The discussion places this proposition within II. Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because administrative burdens do not reliably discriminate between just and unjust claims. It connects to regulatory friction, merit screening, administrative burden, false positives, procedural design, access to justice.

legal thermostats commonly work by adding friction with an often-unverified hope that weaker claims will be deterred. This matters because administrative burdens do not reliably discriminate between just and unjust claims.

regulatory friction
merit screening
administrative burden
false positives
procedural design
access to justice


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 576, that AI makes some existing thermostats fragile by helping users meet deadlines, exhaust remedies, and draft plausible pleadings. The discussion places this proposition within II. Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because filters based on information and labor costs lose force when machines supply those inputs cheaply. It connects to AI-proof regulation, deadlines, administrative exhaustion, pleading assistance, proof of work, regulatory adaptation.

AI makes some existing thermostats fragile by helping users meet deadlines, exhaust remedies, and draft plausible pleadings. This matters because filters based on information and labor costs lose force when machines supply those inputs cheaply.

AI-proof regulation
deadlines
administrative exhaustion
pleading assistance
proof of work
regulatory adaptation

Printed page 576 (PDF page 28) develops this proposition in II. Legal Thermostats.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 576, that plausibility pleading filters poor framing and polish as well as genuinely implausible claims. The discussion places this proposition within II. Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because AI can remove the sophistication penalty without improving the merits of the underlying case. It connects to plausibility, legal polish, pro se litigants, framing, merit, generative drafting.

plausibility pleading filters poor framing and polish as well as genuinely implausible claims. This matters because AI can remove the sophistication penalty without improving the merits of the underlying case.

plausibility
legal polish
pro se litigants
framing
merit
generative drafting


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 576, that a doubling of litigation volume is plausible but the forecast is expressly falsifiable. The discussion places this proposition within II. Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because the article offers a concrete time-sensitive prediction rather than insulating its thesis from evidence. It connects to doubling forecast, falsifiability, litigation patterns, empirical prediction, AI effect, research design.

a doubling of litigation volume is plausible but the forecast is expressly falsifiable. This matters because the article offers a concrete time-sensitive prediction rather than insulating its thesis from evidence.

doubling forecast
falsifiability
litigation patterns
empirical prediction
AI effect
research design


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 577, that AI is likely to increase both the number and intricacy of legal filings. The discussion places this proposition within III.A. Strategy 1: Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because judicial workload depends on material per case as well as case count. It connects to filing volume, filing intricacy, verbosity, judicial workload, litigation boom, attention management.

AI is likely to increase both the number and intricacy of legal filings. This matters because judicial workload depends on material per case as well as case count.

filing volume
filing intricacy
verbosity
judicial workload
litigation boom
attention management

The discussion evaluates likely systemic effects; particular fees, pleading rules, and substantive standards may differ in purpose, legality, and distributional impact.

Printed page 577 (PDF page 29) develops this proposition in III.A. Strategy 1: Legal Thermostats.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 577, that courts could respond by increasing fees, heightening pleading demands, or narrowing substantive rights. The discussion places this proposition within III.A. Strategy 1: Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because historically available levers can suppress demand but place justice costs on litigants. It connects to fees, pleading standards, substantive rights, demand suppression, court response, legal thermostats.

courts could respond by increasing fees, heightening pleading demands, or narrowing substantive rights. This matters because historically available levers can suppress demand but place justice costs on litigants.

fees
pleading standards
substantive rights
demand suppression
court response
legal thermostats


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 577, that the best available time before a litigation boom should be used to build and test court-side AI. The discussion places this proposition within III.A. Strategy 1: Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because institutional preparation expands the option set before caseload pressure makes blunt controls politically attractive. It connects to preparation, AI testing, institutional options, caseload pressure, court modernization, proactive governance.

the best available time before a litigation boom should be used to build and test court-side AI. This matters because institutional preparation expands the option set before caseload pressure makes blunt controls politically attractive.

preparation
AI testing
institutional options
caseload pressure
court modernization
proactive governance


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 578, that higher court fees are a crude filter with disproportionate effects on people who lack capital. The discussion places this proposition within III.A. Strategy 1: Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because liquidity constraints and the risk of ruin prevent even holders of meritorious claims from borrowing to litigate. It connects to court fees, liquidity, risk of ruin, litigation finance, poverty, meritorious claims.

higher court fees are a crude filter with disproportionate effects on people who lack capital. This matters because liquidity constraints and the risk of ruin prevent even holders of meritorious claims from borrowing to litigate.

court fees
liquidity
risk of ruin
litigation finance
poverty
meritorious claims

Printed page 578 (PDF page 30) develops this proposition in III.A. Strategy 1: Legal Thermostats.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 578, that pleading standards can be understood as proof-of-work mechanisms. The discussion places this proposition within III.A. Strategy 1: Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because front-end effort is supposed to signal a claimant's private confidence and screen low-value filings. It connects to proof of work, pleading, signaling, front-end costs, claimant confidence, screening.

pleading standards can be understood as proof-of-work mechanisms. This matters because front-end effort is supposed to signal a claimant's private confidence and screen low-value filings.

proof of work
pleading
signaling
front-end costs
claimant confidence
screening


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 578, that word limits are also crude judicial-economy tools and are not robust to AI. The discussion places this proposition within III.A. Strategy 1: Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because making a filing concise traditionally consumes skill and time that automated summarization can cheaply supply. It connects to word limits, summarization, filing regulation, judicial economy, AI circumvention, legal writing.

word limits are also crude judicial-economy tools and are not robust to AI. This matters because making a filing concise traditionally consumes skill and time that automated summarization can cheaply supply.

word limits
summarization
filing regulation
judicial economy
AI circumvention
legal writing


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 579, that generative AI undermines pleading proof of work by converting vague claims into polished legal arguments. The discussion places this proposition within III.A. Strategy 1: Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because surface quality no longer reliably signals costly human investment or underlying merit. It connects to generative drafting, proof of work, surface plausibility, signal degradation, pleadings, claim merit.

generative AI undermines pleading proof of work by converting vague claims into polished legal arguments. This matters because surface quality no longer reliably signals costly human investment or underlying merit.

generative drafting
proof of work
surface plausibility
signal degradation
pleadings
claim merit

Printed page 579 (PDF page 31) develops this proposition in III.A. Strategy 1: Legal Thermostats.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 579, that AI hallucinations can make a weak filing appear facially plausible. The discussion places this proposition within III.A. Strategy 1: Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because fabricated facts and authorities increase the cost of validation even when they do not improve substantive truth. It connects to hallucinations, facial plausibility, validation costs, false facts, legal authority, quality control.

AI hallucinations can make a weak filing appear facially plausible. This matters because fabricated facts and authorities increase the cost of validation even when they do not improve substantive truth.

hallucinations
facial plausibility
validation costs
false facts
legal authority
quality control


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 579, that judges can conserve resources by quietly demanding more through substantive standards. The discussion places this proposition within III.A. Strategy 1: Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because shifts in concepts such as reasonableness may ration claims without appearing as explicit docket policy. It connects to substantive standards, reasonable person, implicit rationing, doctrinal drift, judicial resources, transparency.

judges can conserve resources by quietly demanding more through substantive standards. This matters because shifts in concepts such as reasonableness may ration claims without appearing as explicit docket policy.

substantive standards
reasonable person
implicit rationing
doctrinal drift
judicial resources
transparency


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 580, that thermostat adjustment can narrow civil rights and subsidize wrongdoing. The discussion places this proposition within III.A. Strategy 1: Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because fewer enforceable claims reduce the expected legal cost of socially harmful conduct. It connects to civil rights, wrongdoing subsidy, deterrence, rights contraction, enforcement, externalities.

thermostat adjustment can narrow civil rights and subsidize wrongdoing. This matters because fewer enforceable claims reduce the expected legal cost of socially harmful conduct.

civil rights
wrongdoing subsidy
deterrence
rights contraction
enforcement
externalities

Printed page 580 (PDF page 32) develops this proposition in III.A. Strategy 1: Legal Thermostats.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in the article “Judicial Economy in the Age of AI” on page 580, that AI-vulnerable thermostats may require repeated escalation. The discussion places this proposition within III.A. Strategy 1: Legal Thermostats and ties the immediate point to the paper's broader distinction between opening access and preserving the institutional capacity to deliver justice. This is significant because each new restriction can be circumvented by better generation, producing unstable and increasingly demanding barriers. It connects to regulatory escalation, AI circumvention, unstable equilibrium, procedural barriers, arms race, legal thermostats.

AI-vulnerable thermostats may require repeated escalation. This matters because each new restriction can be circumvented by better generation, producing unstable and increasingly demanding barriers.

regulatory escalation
AI circumvention
unstable equilibrium
procedural barriers
arms race
legal thermostats