# Time and Contract Interpretation Canonical page: https://works.battleoftheforms.com/papers/ssrn-4809006/ [p. 1] ο€ͺ ο€ͺ [p. 2] INTRODUCTION [p. 3] π‘‡π‘–π‘šπ‘’ π‘Žπ‘›π‘‘ πΆπ‘œπ‘›π‘‘π‘Ÿπ‘Žπ‘π‘‘ πΌπ‘›π‘‘π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘‘π‘Žπ‘‘π‘–π‘œπ‘› [p. 4] I. TWO AND HALF THEORIES OF INTERPRETATION [p. 5] π‘‡π‘–π‘šπ‘’ π‘Žπ‘›π‘‘ πΆπ‘œπ‘›π‘‘π‘Ÿπ‘Žπ‘π‘‘ πΌπ‘›π‘‘π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘‘π‘Žπ‘‘π‘–π‘œπ‘› [p. 6] * [p. 7] π‘‡π‘–π‘šπ‘’ π‘Žπ‘›π‘‘ πΆπ‘œπ‘›π‘‘π‘Ÿπ‘Žπ‘π‘‘ πΌπ‘›π‘‘π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘‘π‘Žπ‘‘π‘–π‘œπ‘› II. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION: FINDING MEANING OR PREDICTING INTENT? [p. 8] β€œA sentence is never not in a context. We are never not in a situation. . . . A set of interpretive assumptions is always in force. A sentence that seems to need no interpretation is already the product of one.” Fish (1978) [Textualists believe that t]he [judge can] . . . retir[e] into that lawyer’s Paradise where all words have a fixed, precisely ascertained meaning; where men may express their purposes, not only with accuracy, but with fullness; and where, if the writer has been careful, a lawyer, having a document referred to him, may sit in his chair, inspect the text, and answer all questions without raising his eyes β€œ(Thayer, 1898, at 428-29) [I]t can hardly be insisted on too often or too vigorously that language at its best is always a defective [p. 9] π‘‡π‘–π‘šπ‘’ π‘Žπ‘›π‘‘ πΆπ‘œπ‘›π‘‘π‘Ÿπ‘Žπ‘π‘‘ πΌπ‘›π‘‘π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘‘π‘Žπ‘‘π‘–π‘œπ‘› and uncertain instrument, that words to not define themselves, that terms and sentences in a contract, a deed or a will do not apply themselves to external objects and performances, that the meaning of such terms and sentences consists of the ideas that they induce in the mind of some individual person who uses or hears or reads them, and that seldom in a litigated case do the words of a contract convey one identical meaning to the two contracting parties or to third persons. Therefore, it is invariably necessary, before a court can give any meaning to the words of a contract and can select one meaning rather than other possible ones as the basis for the determination of rights and other legal effects, that extrinsic evidence shall be heard to make the court aware of the β€œsurrounding circumstances,” including the other persons, objects, and events to which the words can be applied and which caused the words to be used. (emphasis added) (Corbin, 1960, at Β§535) [p. 10] III. PRECISION AND ACCURACY [p. 11] π‘‡π‘–π‘šπ‘’ π‘Žπ‘›π‘‘ πΆπ‘œπ‘›π‘‘π‘Ÿπ‘Žπ‘π‘‘ πΌπ‘›π‘‘π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘‘π‘Žπ‘‘π‘–π‘œπ‘› [p. 12] [p. 13] π‘‡π‘–π‘šπ‘’ π‘Žπ‘›π‘‘ πΆπ‘œπ‘›π‘‘π‘Ÿπ‘Žπ‘π‘‘ πΌπ‘›π‘‘π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘‘π‘Žπ‘‘π‘–π‘œπ‘› Figure 1 Contextualism vs. Textualism as Precision vs. Accuracy [p. 14] [p. 15] π‘‡π‘–π‘šπ‘’ π‘Žπ‘›π‘‘ πΆπ‘œπ‘›π‘‘π‘Ÿπ‘Žπ‘π‘‘ πΌπ‘›π‘‘π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘‘π‘Žπ‘‘π‘–π‘œπ‘› IV. BIAS V. VARIANCE [p. 16] 𝑀𝑆𝐸 = π΅π‘–π‘Žπ‘ 2+π‘£π‘Žπ‘Ÿπ‘–π‘Žπ‘›π‘π‘’+π‘–π‘Ÿπ‘Ÿπ‘’π‘‘π‘’π‘π‘–π‘π‘™π‘’ π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘Ÿπ‘œπ‘Ÿπ‘  [p. 17] π‘‡π‘–π‘šπ‘’ π‘Žπ‘›π‘‘ πΆπ‘œπ‘›π‘‘π‘Ÿπ‘Žπ‘π‘‘ πΌπ‘›π‘‘π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘‘π‘Žπ‘‘π‘–π‘œπ‘› π΅π‘–π‘Žπ‘ 2 = (𝐸 (𝑓̂(π‘₯;𝐷)βˆ’π‘“(π‘₯)) 𝐷 π‘‰π‘Žπ‘Ÿπ‘–π‘Žπ‘›π‘π‘’ = 𝐸 [(𝑓̂(π‘₯;𝐷)βˆ’πΈ [𝑓̂(π‘₯;𝐷)]) 2 ] 𝐷 𝐷 𝑓̂ [p. 18] [p. 19] π‘‡π‘–π‘šπ‘’ π‘Žπ‘›π‘‘ πΆπ‘œπ‘›π‘‘π‘Ÿπ‘Žπ‘π‘‘ πΌπ‘›π‘‘π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘‘π‘Žπ‘‘π‘–π‘œπ‘› [p. 20] V. INTERPRETATION VERSUS SIMULATION [p. 21] π‘‡π‘–π‘šπ‘’ π‘Žπ‘›π‘‘ πΆπ‘œπ‘›π‘‘π‘Ÿπ‘Žπ‘π‘‘ πΌπ‘›π‘‘π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘‘π‘Žπ‘‘π‘–π‘œπ‘› [p. 22] [p. 23] π‘‡π‘–π‘šπ‘’ π‘Žπ‘›π‘‘ πΆπ‘œπ‘›π‘‘π‘Ÿπ‘Žπ‘π‘‘ πΌπ‘›π‘‘π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘‘π‘Žπ‘‘π‘–π‘œπ‘› β€œShould [Alice] be absolutely confident that [Bob] prefers the new arrangement, it would not be a breach of [Alice’s] promise for her to leave a message for [Bob] simply informing [Bob] of the new plan. [Bob’s]’s actual consent is not important where there is no uncertainty about [Bob’s]’s understanding of her interests.” β€œBecause intimates know more about each other, they can more reliably assess and act on a richer account of each other’s evolving interests; to the extent this holds true, they can adopt and continually update an ex-post view.” [p. 24] [p. 25] π‘‡π‘–π‘šπ‘’ π‘Žπ‘›π‘‘ πΆπ‘œπ‘›π‘‘π‘Ÿπ‘Žπ‘π‘‘ πΌπ‘›π‘‘π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘‘π‘Žπ‘‘π‘–π‘œπ‘› [p. 26] [p. 27] π‘‡π‘–π‘šπ‘’ π‘Žπ‘›π‘‘ πΆπ‘œπ‘›π‘‘π‘Ÿπ‘Žπ‘π‘‘ πΌπ‘›π‘‘π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘‘π‘Žπ‘‘π‘–π‘œπ‘› [p. 28] CONCLUSION [p. 29] π‘‡π‘–π‘šπ‘’ π‘Žπ‘›π‘‘ πΆπ‘œπ‘›π‘‘π‘Ÿπ‘Žπ‘π‘‘ πΌπ‘›π‘‘π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘‘π‘Žπ‘‘π‘–π‘œπ‘› 1. Arbel, Yonathan and David Hoffman. β€œGenerative Interpretation.” New York University Law Review (Forthcoming, 2024). 2. Bagchi, Aditi. "Separating Contract and Promise." Florida State University Law Review 38 (2011): 709-758. 3. Barnett, Randy E. "The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent." Virginia Law Review 78, no. 4 (1992): 821-911. 4. Bridgeman, Curtis. "Default Rules, Penalty Default Rules, and New Formalism." Florida State University Law Review 33, no. 3 (2006): 683-720. 5. Corbin, Arthur Linton. Corbin on Contracts. 1st ed. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1960. 6. DiMatteo, Larry A. "Reason and Context: A Dual Track Theory of Interpretation." Penn State Law Review 109, no. 2 (2004): 397-486. 7. Eisenberg, Melvin A. Foundational Principles of Contract Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. 8. Fish, Stanley. "Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, the Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes without Saying, and Other Special Cases." Critical Inquiry 4, no. 4 (1978): 625-644. 9. Geman, Donald, Edir Bienenstock, and RenΓ© Doursat. "Neural Networks and the Bias/Variance Dilemma." Neural Computation 4, no. 1 (1992): 1-58. 10. Gilson, Ronald J., Charles F. Sabel, and Robert E. Scott. "Text and Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract Design." Cornell Law Review 100, no. 1 (2014): 23-98. 11. Goldberg, Victor P. "Impossibility and Related Excuses." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift FΓΌr Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft 144, no. 1 (1988): 100-116. 12. Greene, Marjorie. "Theories of Interpretation in the Law of Contracts." The University of Chicago Law Review 6, no. 3 (1939): 374-394. 13. Klass, Gregory. "Interpretation and Construction in Contract Law." Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works, 2018. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2913228 . [p. 30] 14. Leech, Geoffrey, and Jenny Thomas. "Language, Meaning and Context: Pragmatics." In An Encyclopedia of Language, edited by N.E. Collinge, 173-206. London: Routledge, 1989. 15. Linzer, Peter. "The Comfort of Certainty: Plain Meaning and the Parol Evidence Rule." Fordham Law Review 71, no. 3 (2002): 799-836. 16. Listokin, Yair. "The Meaning of Contractual Silence: A Field Experiment." Journal of Legal Analysis 2, no. 2 (2010): 397416. 17. Maggs, Gregory E. "Karl Llewellyn's Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code." University of Colorado Law Review 71, no. 2 (2000): 541-588. 18. Martinez, Eric, and Kevin Tobia. "What Do Law Professors Believe About Law and the Legal Academy?" Georgetown Law Journal 112 (forthcoming 2023): 1120189. 19. McElroy, R. G., and Glanville Williams. "The Coronation Casesβ€”I." Modern Law Review 4, no. 4 (April 1941): 24160. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1940.tb00777.x. 20. Mitchell, Catherine. Interpretation of Contracts. 2nd ed. London: Routledge-Cavendish, 2019. 21. Posner, Richard A. "The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation." Law & Economics Working Paper No. 229, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, University of Chicago Law School, 2004. 22. Saussure, Ferdinand de. Course in General Linguistics. Edited by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye. Translated by Wade Baskin. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. 23. Schwartz, Alan, and Robert E. Scott. "Contract Interpretation Redux." The Yale Law Journal 119, no. 5 (2010): 926-964. 24. Schwartz, Alan, and Robert E. Scott. "The Limits of Contract Law." Yale Law Journal 113 (2003): 541, 573. 25. Scott, Robert E. "The Rise and Fall of Article 2." Louisiana Law Review 62, no. 4 (2002): 1009-1064. 26. Scott, Robert E., and George G. Triantis. "Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design." The Yale Law Journal 115, no. 4 (2006): 814-879. 27. Shackel, Nicholas. "The Vacuity of Postmodernist Methodology." Metaphilosophy 36, no. 3 (2005): 295-320. 28. Shalev-Shwartz, Shai, and Shai Ben-David. Understanding Machine Learning: From Theory to Algorithms. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. [p. 31] π‘‡π‘–π‘šπ‘’ π‘Žπ‘›π‘‘ πΆπ‘œπ‘›π‘‘π‘Ÿπ‘Žπ‘π‘‘ πΌπ‘›π‘‘π‘’π‘Ÿπ‘π‘Ÿπ‘’π‘‘π‘Žπ‘‘π‘–π‘œπ‘› 29. Silverstein, Joshua M. "The Contract Interpretation Policy Debate: A Primer." Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance 26, no. 2 (2021): 222-294. 30. Stempel, Jeffrey W., and Erik S. Knutsen. "Rejecting Word Worship: An Integrative Approach to Judicial Construction of Insurance Policies." University of Cincinnati Law Review 90, no. 2 (2021): 561-636. 31. Thayer, James Bradley. A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1898. 32. Wellman, Henry M. "Developing a Theory of Mind." In The Wiley-Blackwell Handbook of Childhood Cognitive Development, edited by Usha Goswami, 258-284. 2nd ed. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.