Yonathan A. Arbel, On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts, 37 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 151 (2023).

Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 1–4, that contracts are falling in duration, stakes, and scope, and that change in scale has deep legal and social consequences. Digital formation, cultural acceptance of electronic deals, ubiquitous connectivity, tokenization, service models, and AI agents permit transactions that once were too fleeting or small to enter explicit markets. This is significant because miniaturization changes what can be owned, sold, worked, and governed rather than merely making familiar bargains cheaper. It connects to contract scale, digital contracting, transaction costs, AI agents, tokenization, social transformation.

Contracts are falling in duration, stakes, and scope, and that change in scale has deep legal and social consequences This matters because miniaturization changes what can be owned, sold, worked, and governed rather than merely making familiar bargains cheaper.

contract scale
digital contracting
transaction costs
AI agents
tokenization
social transformation

The article is deliberately predictive and asks readers to suspend disbelief about particular implementations.

Pages 1-4 state the scale thesis and identify the technological trends enabling near-zero-latency transactions.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 1–2, that nano contracts promise new transactions, income, and reduced dependence on ownership while creating risks of market creep, disparate impact, and regulatory failure. The article treats opportunity and harm as jointly produced by the same ability to convert norm-governed interactions into explicit bargains. This is significant because a serious account of legal innovation must identify both who gains and whose social world is disrupted. It connects to market creep, distributive effects, wealth creation, ownership, regulatory design, commodification.

Nano contracts promise new transactions, income, and reduced dependence on ownership while creating risks of market creep, disparate impact, and regulatory failure This matters because a serious account of legal innovation must identify both who gains and whose social world is disrupted.

market creep
distributive effects
wealth creation
ownership
regulatory design
commodification

The abstract presents a research agenda rather than an empirical estimate of net welfare.

The abstract previews the benefits, risks, enforceability issues, and private-law implications.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 4–5, that nano contracts are digitally negotiated, automated, near-instantaneous peer-to-peer agreements involving tiny values, brief duration, or slivers of rights. Their scale can be measured along multiple dimensions, including seconds of performance, fractions of a dollar, and fragments of the ownership bundle. This is significant because the category identifies transactions whose surplus would ordinarily be consumed by negotiation, payment, or enforcement costs. It connects to peer-to-peer bargaining, automation, micropayments, short duration, fractional rights, transaction scale.

Nano contracts are digitally negotiated, automated, near-instantaneous peer-to-peer agreements involving tiny values, brief duration, or slivers of rights This matters because the category identifies transactions whose surplus would ordinarily be consumed by negotiation, payment, or enforcement costs.

peer-to-peer bargaining
automation
micropayments
short duration
fractional rights
transaction scale

Scale is multidimensional, so the concept has a core and periphery rather than a sharp quantitative boundary.

Pages 4-5 define nano contracts and give examples of their stakes, duration, and scope.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 4–5, that peer-to-peer nano contracts can reduce dependence on firms and platforms as transaction intermediaries. Standard protocols may allow individuals or connected objects to find and bargain with one another directly even if some implementations still use platform infrastructure. This is significant because smaller contracts need not imply greater centralized control if their communication and payment layers are interoperable. It connects to disintermediation, peer-to-peer markets, protocols, platform power, connected objects, market infrastructure.

Peer-to-peer nano contracts can reduce dependence on firms and platforms as transaction intermediaries This matters because smaller contracts need not imply greater centralized control if their communication and payment layers are interoperable.

disintermediation
peer-to-peer markets
protocols
platform power
connected objects
market infrastructure

Many practical solutions discussed later still rely on powerful platforms, so disintermediation is a possibility rather than a necessary feature.

Pages 4-5 distinguish p2p nano contracts from transactions mediated by central firms.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 5–6, that at nano scale, the boundary between an enforceable contract and a spot exchange becomes unstable. Traditional classifications assume identifiable parties, deliberate negotiation, capacity, and recognizable value exchange, but automated fleeting interactions may satisfy those assumptions only imperfectly. This is significant because transactional miniaturization can unsettle the basic legal ontology of agreement. It connects to contract formation, spot exchange, legal classification, automated agents, capacity, enforceability.

At nano scale, the boundary between an enforceable contract and a spot exchange becomes unstable This matters because transactional miniaturization can unsettle the basic legal ontology of agreement.

contract formation
spot exchange
legal classification
automated agents
capacity
enforceability

The article acknowledges that reasonable observers may classify some examples as transactions rather than contracts.

Pages 5-6 explain why ordinary distinctions between contract and exchange blur at small scales.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 5–6, that the gig economy demonstrates that a change in transactional form can destabilize employment and contract classifications. Uber invokes thin matching relationships to resist employer obligations while relying on thick terms of service with passengers, showing how platforms strategically characterize scaled-down relations. This is significant because classification battles are predictable consequences of new transactional scale, not incidental doctrinal puzzles. It connects to gig economy, worker classification, Uber, platform law, employment status, strategic characterization.

The gig economy demonstrates that a change in transactional form can destabilize employment and contract classifications This matters because classification battles are predictable consequences of new transactional scale, not incidental doctrinal puzzles.

gig economy
worker classification
Uber
platform law
employment status
strategic characterization

Nano engagements may differ materially from ride-hailing, so the gig economy is an analogy rather than a complete template.

Pages 5-6 use Uber classification disputes to illustrate how technological forms blur legal relationships.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 6, that in law, scale has a quality of its own because changing the size of an interaction can generate new legal configurations. A seconds-long right to use space or a token-paid right of way may not fit the lease, license, property, or contract concepts designed for larger and more durable relationships. This is significant because doctrine cannot assume that rules scale down linearly with the transactions they govern. It connects to scale effects, legal categories, leases, licenses, rights of way, private law theory.

In law, scale has a quality of its own because changing the size of an interaction can generate new legal configurations This matters because doctrine cannot assume that rules scale down linearly with the transactions they govern.

scale effects
legal categories
leases
licenses
rights of way
private law theory

The claim is developed through thought experiments and analogies rather than a general formal theory of scale.

Page 6 makes the central jurisprudential claim that scale can change legal quality.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 6, that nano contracts differ from smart contracts because their central problem is formation rather than execution. Smart-contract systems automate performance of an already defined arrangement, whereas nano-contract technology must locate parties, negotiate terms, form assent, and transfer tiny values before small surplus disappears. This is significant because similar digital tools target different bottlenecks in the contracting process. It connects to smart contracts, contract formation, contract execution, transaction bottlenecks, automation, legal technology.

Nano contracts differ from smart contracts because their central problem is formation rather than execution This matters because similar digital tools target different bottlenecks in the contracting process.

smart contracts
contract formation
contract execution
transaction bottlenecks
automation
legal technology

A single system can combine both technologies, and the distinction concerns focus rather than mutual exclusivity.

Page 6 contrasts nano-contract formation technology with smart-contract governance and execution.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 6, that nano contracting does not inherently require blockchain or cryptography. Distributed ledgers may be useful for some payments or escrows, but they can be too slow and costly for the latency and value constraints that define nano transactions. This is significant because equating every automated agreement with blockchain obscures the relevant engineering requirements. It connects to blockchain, cryptography, settlement latency, transaction fees, smart contracts, technology neutrality.

Nano contracting does not inherently require blockchain or cryptography This matters because equating every automated agreement with blockchain obscures the relevant engineering requirements.

blockchain
cryptography
settlement latency
transaction fees
smart contracts
technology neutrality

Future blockchain or payment designs may satisfy constraints that contemporary implementations do not.

Page 6 identifies nano contracts as technology-neutral and focused on low-cost formation.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 7–8, that nano contracts can open markets in interactions now governed only by social norms, producing both wealth and commodification. Queue positions, moments of attention, fragments of use, and casual assistance may become saleable, benefiting some marginal participants while exposing others to exploitation or norm erosion. This is significant because lower transaction costs can change the moral and political character of everyday life. It connects to marketization, social norms, creative destruction, sharing economy, distribution, commodification.

Nano contracts can open markets in interactions now governed only by social norms, producing both wealth and commodification This matters because lower transaction costs can change the moral and political character of everyday life.

marketization
social norms
creative destruction
sharing economy
distribution
commodification

The direction and magnitude of these effects are uncertain and context-specific.

Pages 7-8 frame nano contracts as both market-making and socially disruptive.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 7–8, that the relevant policy question is not only what innovation will break but whose interests and institutions will bear the loss. Experiences with Uber, Airbnb, and Taskrabbit show that new income for some can coexist with worker losses, higher housing costs, and disruption of incumbent communities. This is significant because aggregate gains can conceal unequal burdens and political choices about their distribution. It connects to disparate impact, sharing economy, housing costs, labor displacement, creative destruction, equity.

The relevant policy question is not only what innovation will break but whose interests and institutions will bear the loss This matters because aggregate gains can conceal unequal burdens and political choices about their distribution.

disparate impact
sharing economy
housing costs
labor displacement
creative destruction
equity

The article uses mixed evidence from the sharing economy and does not claim a single distributional pattern for every nano market.

Pages 7-8 demand distribution-sensitive analysis and acknowledge predictive uncertainty.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 9, that traffic rules allocate a scarce right of way even though drivers usually experience them as commands rather than resource-allocation systems. Physical exclusivity makes intersection access rivalrous, so legal design determines who receives a valuable movement right and on what basis. This is significant because reframing mundane coordination as allocation reveals choices hidden inside seemingly neutral rules. It connects to right of way, traffic law, scarce resources, allocation, coordination, legal design.

Traffic rules allocate a scarce right of way even though drivers usually experience them as commands rather than resource-allocation systems This matters because reframing mundane coordination as allocation reveals choices hidden inside seemingly neutral rules.

right of way
traffic law
scarce resources
allocation
coordination
legal design

The thought experiment simplifies road safety, traffic flow, and multi-vehicle dynamics.

Page 9 recasts the four-way stop as an allocation problem.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 9, that first-in-first-out traffic rules ignore need, urgency, desert, and willingness to yield. Although antecedence is administrable, it awards priority through arrival timing and chance rather than any direct measure of social value. This is significant because simple coordination rules can be both functional and systematically inefficient or morally crude. It connects to FIFO, traffic priority, formal fairness, urgency, resource allocation, administrability.

First-in-first-out traffic rules ignore need, urgency, desert, and willingness to yield This matters because simple coordination rules can be both functional and systematically inefficient or morally crude.

FIFO
traffic priority
formal fairness
urgency
resource allocation
administrability

Mechanistic rules may retain safety and predictability advantages not fully modeled in the example.

Page 9 critiques first-in-first-out allocation at intersections.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 9–10, that ordinary triage cannot efficiently allocate routine road priority because urgency is costly to verify and cheap to exaggerate. Drivers have private information about the value of arriving sooner, but individualized investigation at every intersection would consume more resources than the right itself. This is significant because information and credibility costs prevent potentially valuable trades even where interests differ. It connects to private information, verification costs, triage, urgency, credible signals, transaction costs.

Ordinary triage cannot efficiently allocate routine road priority because urgency is costly to verify and cheap to exaggerate This matters because information and credibility costs prevent potentially valuable trades even where interests differ.

private information
verification costs
triage
urgency
credible signals
transaction costs

Emergency vehicles and traffic engineering already provide limited nonmarket priority rules.

Pages 9-10 explain why direct inquiry into each driver's need is unworkable.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 10, that an automated penny auction could allocate right of way to the driver who values it most and compensate those who wait. Drivers would set destinations and urgency in advance, their devices would bargain silently as they approach, and payments or tokens would move in the background. This is significant because nano contracts convert inaccessible private valuations into an operational allocation mechanism. It connects to automated auctions, traffic priority, micropayments, advance preferences, vehicle connectivity, compensation.

An automated penny auction could allocate right of way to the driver who values it most and compensate those who wait This matters because nano contracts convert inaccessible private valuations into an operational allocation mechanism.

automated auctions
traffic priority
micropayments
advance preferences
vehicle connectivity
compensation

The example assumes safe, reliable, interoperable technology and does not specify a complete traffic-control protocol.

Page 10 describes the automated four-way-stop auction.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 10–11, that priority trading could improve control, flow, safety, and emissions while using tokens to address monetary inequality. Drivers in a rush receive an alternative to speeding, patient drivers monetize delay, and dynamic allocation may reduce unnecessary idling and fuel consumption. This is significant because a tiny bargain can aggregate into system-level welfare gains across billions of trips. It connects to traffic safety, emissions, idling, priority tokens, driver autonomy, aggregate welfare.

Priority trading could improve control, flow, safety, and emissions while using tokens to address monetary inequality This matters because a tiny bargain can aggregate into system-level welfare gains across billions of trips.

traffic safety
emissions
idling
priority tokens
driver autonomy
aggregate welfare

The claimed gains are prospective and depend on implementation effects on routing, congestion, and behavior.

Pages 10-11 identify the potential efficiency, safety, environmental, and equity gains.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 11, that the four-way-stop market also risks wealth-based priority, commodification, norm erosion, and dangerous breach. Poor drivers could face repeated delay, courteous waving may disappear, and a driver who ignores the purchased allocation could create physical harm. This is significant because the same mechanism that prices urgency can entrench inequality and crowd out valuable social practices. It connects to wealth inequality, commodification, social norms, breach, road safety, ethical design.

The four-way-stop market also risks wealth-based priority, commodification, norm erosion, and dangerous breach This matters because the same mechanism that prices urgency can entrench inequality and crowd out valuable social practices.

wealth inequality
commodification
social norms
breach
road safety
ethical design

Empirical work on tolling suggests distributional effects can sometimes be progressive, so implementation details are decisive.

Page 11 presents the ethical and legal objections generated by the thought experiment.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 11–12, that small stakes do not make nano contracts legally trivial because earlier scale transformations produced profound social outcomes. The history from status to contract and from long-term employment or ownership to gigs shows that modularization can reorganize freedom, work, and resource allocation. This is significant because the significance of a transactional technology cannot be inferred from the value of each individual deal. It connects to historical analogy, status to contract, gig economy, modularity, social change, transaction scale.

Small stakes do not make nano contracts legally trivial because earlier scale transformations produced profound social outcomes This matters because the significance of a transactional technology cannot be inferred from the value of each individual deal.

historical analogy
status to contract
gig economy
modularity
social change
transaction scale

The historical account is stylized and expressly not a linear or comprehensive history of Anglo-American contract.

Pages 11-12 introduce the historical response to the “small potatoes” objection.


Part III.A: Scale and Contract Evolution

Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 12–14, that the movement from status to contract was also a downscaling from all-encompassing legal identities to modular, terminable arrangements. Employment contracts, leases, bailments, and warranties separated discrete functions once bundled into inherited or coercive statuses. This is significant because transactional modularity can expand individual choice even when the resulting contracts remain imperfect or unequal. It connects to status to contract, modularity, employment, leases, bailments, individual freedom.

The movement from status to contract was also a downscaling from all-encompassing legal identities to modular, terminable arrangements This matters because transactional modularity can expand individual choice even when the resulting contracts remain imperfect or unequal.

status to contract
modularity
employment
leases
bailments
individual freedom

The narrative draws on Maine and is qualified by historical and ideological critiques, including the persistence of coerced labor.

Pages 12-14 describe status arrangements and the uneven rise of smaller contractual forms.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 13–14, that Johann Sebastian Bach's move from status-bound service to formal contract illustrates both liberation and new conflict. Contractual freedom enabled him to leave a restrictive lord and build a career in Leipzig, but also exposed him to negotiation, responsibility, and disputes with counterparties. This is significant because downscaling legal status can empower agency without guaranteeing satisfaction or equal bargaining. It connects to Johann Sebastian Bach, service status, contractual freedom, negotiation, historical change, worker agency.

Johann Sebastian Bach's move from status-bound service to formal contract illustrates both liberation and new conflict This matters because downscaling legal status can empower agency without guaranteeing satisfaction or equal bargaining.

Johann Sebastian Bach
service status
contractual freedom
negotiation
historical change
worker agency

One prominent life is a synecdoche rather than representative proof of the broader transition.

Pages 13-14 use Bach's career to humanize the move from status to contract.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 14–15, that the gig economy downscaled personal drivers, general service contracts, and home subleases into single rides, brief tasks, and one-night stays. Its innovation was less a new doctrine than internet infrastructure capable of sustaining large marketplaces for short, narrow engagements. This is significant because technological reduction of search and coordination costs can transform society without a corresponding doctrinal invention. It connects to gig economy, Uber, Fiverr, Airbnb, marketplaces, transaction costs.

The gig economy downscaled personal drivers, general service contracts, and home subleases into single rides, brief tasks, and one-night stays This matters because technological reduction of search and coordination costs can transform society without a corresponding doctrinal invention.

gig economy
Uber
Fiverr
Airbnb
marketplaces
transaction costs

The gig economy's mix of worker freedom, exploitation, neighborhood effects, and incumbent loss remains contested.

Pages 14-15 describe the scale change produced by major gig platforms.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 15, that status, contract, gig, and nano arrangements form a historical arc of shrinking transactional blocks. Each stage permits more granular and flexible combinations of rights and services, with macro-level social consequences emerging from micro-level modularity. This is significant because nano contracts are best understood as a continuation and acceleration of an established trajectory. It connects to transactional arc, downscaling, modularity, contract history, gig work, nano contracts.

Status, contract, gig, and nano arrangements form a historical arc of shrinking transactional blocks This matters because nano contracts are best understood as a continuation and acceleration of an established trajectory.

transactional arc
downscaling
modularity
contract history
gig work
nano contracts

The arc is a conceptual frame and does not claim inevitability, uniform progress, or a single global sequence.

Page 15 summarizes the historical argument and transitions to feasibility.


Part III.B: Nano Contracts as Technology

Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 16, that nano-contract scale is multidimensional across duration, stakes, and scope of rights. A seconds-long lease may carry high value, while a long-lived transaction may involve a minute payment or narrow permission, preventing a single numerical cutoff. This is significant because legal analysis must identify which dimension of scale creates the institutional problem. It connects to multidimensional scale, duration, stakes, scope, high-frequency trading, category boundaries.

Nano-contract scale is multidimensional across duration, stakes, and scope of rights This matters because legal analysis must identify which dimension of scale creates the institutional problem.

multidimensional scale
duration
stakes
scope
high-frequency trading
category boundaries

The article deliberately leaves exact boundary lines to use-case analysis.

Page 16 explains the flexibility and definitional difficulty of nano contracts.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 16–17, that the Everything-as-a-Service model supplies market evidence for nanonizing products into the functions users actually need. Software, infrastructure, platforms, payments, and farm equipment increasingly shift from lump ownership to access for a bounded task or time. This is significant because existing commercial demand for unbundled use makes further transactional miniaturization plausible. It connects to XaaS, product unbundling, access over ownership, subscription models, functional rights, commercial trends.

The Everything-as-a-Service model supplies market evidence for nanonizing products into the functions users actually need This matters because existing commercial demand for unbundled use makes further transactional miniaturization plausible.

XaaS
product unbundling
access over ownership
subscription models
functional rights
commercial trends

XaaS is generally peer-to-firm and therefore differs from the p2p ambition of nano contracts.

Pages 16-17 connect nano contracting to the growth and philosophy of XaaS.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 17, that farming-as-a-service shows how disaggregation can provide capital-intensive functions without ownership. Farmers can obtain a tractor, reaper, cultivator, or tiller for the needed task through an app or call center rather than purchase a rarely available machine. This is significant because small access contracts can expand productive capacity for people who cannot finance whole assets. It connects to farming as a service, tractor access, capital constraints, specialization, India, functional unbundling.

Farming-as-a-service shows how disaggregation can provide capital-intensive functions without ownership This matters because small access contracts can expand productive capacity for people who cannot finance whole assets.

farming as a service
tractor access
capital constraints
specialization
India
functional unbundling

The example is platform-based and does not establish how fully decentralized agricultural nano markets would operate.

Page 17 uses Trringo and village-level tractor scarcity to illustrate nanonization.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 17, that nano contracts extend XaaS by moving from peer-to-firm access toward peer-to-peer exchange. Even where a platform supplies infrastructure, individuals rather than a central asset-owning company can provide the fragmented good, service, or right. This is significant because who supplies the asset affects concentration, income distribution, and the degree of intermediation. It connects to peer-to-peer exchange, XaaS, platforms, decentralization, asset ownership, market structure.

Nano contracts extend XaaS by moving from peer-to-firm access toward peer-to-peer exchange This matters because who supplies the asset affects concentration, income distribution, and the degree of intermediation.

peer-to-peer exchange
XaaS
platforms
decentralization
asset ownership
market structure

Network effects and payment systems may still recreate central platform power.

Page 17 distinguishes the central-firm XaaS model from nano contracting's p2p form.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 18, that smart contracts streamline execution, while nano contracts streamline the creation of agreements at negligible cost and latency. A smart contract can enforce a future exchange among distrustful parties, but that does not by itself solve rapid partner matching, bargaining, assent, or tiny payment economics. This is significant because formation and performance require distinct technical and legal solutions. It connects to smart contracts, execution, formation, blockchain, trust, latency.

Smart contracts streamline execution, while nano contracts streamline the creation of agreements at negligible cost and latency This matters because formation and performance require distinct technical and legal solutions.

smart contracts
execution
formation
blockchain
trust
latency

Many deployed systems may combine automated formation, smart execution, and distributed ledgers.

Page 18 develops the technological distinction and notes blockchain settlement limits.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 19–20, that nano contracts must satisfy five linked constraints: triangulation, streamlined formation, payment, dispute resolution, and deterrent enforcement. Because surplus is tiny, a failure in any one layer can consume the entire benefit and collapse the market. This is significant because legal feasibility depends on the complete transaction stack rather than a clever bargaining algorithm alone. It connects to transaction stack, triangulation, contract formation, payments, dispute resolution, enforcement.

Nano contracts must satisfy five linked constraints: triangulation, streamlined formation, payment, dispute resolution, and deterrent enforcement This matters because legal feasibility depends on the complete transaction stack rather than a clever bargaining algorithm alone.

transaction stack
triangulation
contract formation
payments
dispute resolution
enforcement

The five-part framework adapts transaction-cost analysis and may not exhaust every technical, safety, or privacy constraint.

Pages 19-20 enumerate the five practical requirements.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 19, that triangulation costs must be exceptionally small because locating a partner, setting price, and agreeing on terms can exceed nano surplus. Dealerships can charge to match buyers and sellers in a valuable car market, but the same search and negotiation burden would destroy a penny-scale trade. This is significant because market thickness alone does not create exchange when matching costs are large relative to value. It connects to triangulation, search costs, price discovery, matching, transaction surplus, two-sided markets.

Triangulation costs must be exceptionally small because locating a partner, setting price, and agreeing on terms can exceed nano surplus This matters because market thickness alone does not create exchange when matching costs are large relative to value.

triangulation
search costs
price discovery
matching
transaction surplus
two-sided markets

Commoditization and repeated interaction may reduce these costs differently across use cases.

Page 19 defines triangulation and applies it to low-value transactions.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 19–20, that per-transaction deliberation and assent can make real-time nano contracting impossible. Even a small click, disclosure, or negotiation delay multiplied across rapid transactions can dominate the value, so formation must rely on advance instructions and automation. This is significant because procedural protections appropriate for macro contracts may become prohibitive at nano scale. It connects to assent costs, automation, advance consent, disclosures, latency, contract formalities.

Per-transaction deliberation and assent can make real-time nano contracting impossible This matters because procedural protections appropriate for macro contracts may become prohibitive at nano scale.

assent costs
automation
advance consent
disclosures
latency
contract formalities

Streamlining assent can intensify concerns about notice, comprehension, and unauthorized agent behavior.

Pages 19-20 explain why ordinary real-time manifestations of assent do not scale down.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 20, that payment processing must be faster and cheaper than infrastructure designed for ordinary card transactions. Fixed fees tolerated in car purchases or even gum sales can exceed a nano payment, while delayed aggregation undermines transactions requiring immediate settlement. This is significant because payment rails are a legal and economic constraint on the range of contractible values. It connects to micropayments, payment fees, settlement speed, Dodd-Frank, financial infrastructure, transaction costs.

Payment processing must be faster and cheaper than infrastructure designed for ordinary card transactions This matters because payment rails are a legal and economic constraint on the range of contractible values.

micropayments
payment fees
settlement speed
Dodd-Frank
financial infrastructure
transaction costs

The payment landscape changes quickly, and later infrastructure may support lower costs than the historical examples.

Page 20 identifies payment security, speed, and cost as a feasibility condition.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 20, that ordinary courts, small claims, and even arbitration fit nano disputes poorly despite the need for trustworthy redress. Fees, delay, and de minimis rules make individual adjudication irrational, yet allowing breach with impunity would unravel expectations and reduce trade. This is significant because small stakes do not eliminate the need for governance; they change the form governance must take. It connects to access to justice, de minimis doctrine, small claims, arbitration, breach, private ordering.

Ordinary courts, small claims, and even arbitration fit nano disputes poorly despite the need for trustworthy redress This matters because small stakes do not eliminate the need for governance; they change the form governance must take.

access to justice
de minimis doctrine
small claims
arbitration
breach
private ordering

Class or group mechanisms can aggregate homogeneous claims but solve only part of a heterogeneous nano-dispute problem.

Page 20 states the dispute-resolution constraint and the limits of existing forums.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 20, that nano enforcement must impose enough expected cost to deter noncompliance even when collection itself is uneconomic. Macro defendants may evade judgment through delay or asset shielding, while nano defendants create the inverse problem: available assets but a claim too small to pursue. This is significant because effective obligations require sanctions whose administration is proportional to the transaction. It connects to deterrence, collection costs, judgment proofing, expected sanctions, breach, proportional enforcement.

Nano enforcement must impose enough expected cost to deter noncompliance even when collection itself is uneconomic This matters because effective obligations require sanctions whose administration is proportional to the transaction.

deterrence
collection costs
judgment proofing
expected sanctions
breach
proportional enforcement

The optimal deterrent can vary with safety risk, repetition, and the availability of reputational sanctions.

Page 20 distinguishes deterrence from formal judgment and frames the collection problem.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 21, that the gig economy shows that platforms and reputation can support small transactions, though neither institution is perfect. Virtual marketplaces reduce search, centralize payments and disputes, and build histories that discipline parties outside court. This is significant because nano contracting can adapt working infrastructure rather than solve every institutional problem from scratch. It connects to gig platforms, reputation, market design, private ordering, transaction costs, institutional borrowing.

The gig economy shows that platforms and reputation can support small transactions, though neither institution is perfect This matters because nano contracting can adapt working infrastructure rather than solve every institutional problem from scratch.

gig platforms
reputation
market design
private ordering
transaction costs
institutional borrowing

Micro-gig solutions may remain too costly or centralized for substantially smaller nano transactions.

Page 21 introduces platforms and reputation as proven but imperfect mechanisms.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 21–22, that protocols can reduce triangulation without granting a platform monopoly, but they shift costs to standard-setting and maintenance. Open communication rules can let strangers locate and bargain directly, as internet and blockchain protocols illustrate, while platform marketplaces provide easier centralized coordination. This is significant because institutional architecture trades convenience and network effects against concentration and update governance. It connects to protocols, platform monopolies, open standards, network effects, standard setting, decentralization.

Protocols can reduce triangulation without granting a platform monopoly, but they shift costs to standard-setting and maintenance This matters because institutional architecture trades convenience and network effects against concentration and update governance.

protocols
platform monopolies
open standards
network effects
standard setting
decentralization

Protocol development, propagation, security, and community splits are substantial real costs.

Pages 21-22 place centralized ordering, platforms, and direct protocols on an intermediation spectrum.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 22–23, that advance consent conveyed by an algorithm can form a valid nano contract when it has a verifiable pedigree of authorization. Agency law already permits offers and acceptances through representatives, corporations contract through agents, and digital assent is not invalid merely because the medium is automated. This is significant because the core formation question is authority and meaningful assent, not whether a human clicks at the moment of exchange. It connects to agency law, algorithmic assent, advance authorization, digital contracts, corporate contracting, contract formation.

Advance consent conveyed by an algorithm can form a valid nano contract when it has a verifiable pedigree of authorization This matters because the core formation question is authority and meaningful assent, not whether a human clicks at the moment of exchange.

agency law
algorithmic assent
advance authorization
digital contracts
corporate contracting
contract formation

General concerns about unread clickwraps, defective understanding, or unauthorized action remain and depend on implementation.

Pages 22-23 defend preauthorized automated formation using agency and vending-machine analogies.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 23–24, that nano payments can be supported by platform accumulation, lower-cost tokens, or future improvements in financial infrastructure. Batching many tiny balances into one transfer avoids fixed fees, while protocol currencies may permit direct settlement if their own transaction costs fall enough. This is significant because payment inefficiency is also a source of platform power and a target for structural reform. It connects to payment aggregation, tokens, cryptocurrency, platform power, batch settlement, financial innovation.

Nano payments can be supported by platform accumulation, lower-cost tokens, or future improvements in financial infrastructure This matters because payment inefficiency is also a source of platform power and a target for structural reform.

payment aggregation
tokens
cryptocurrency
platform power
batch settlement
financial innovation

Contemporary cryptocurrency fees cited in the paper remained too high for many nano uses.

Pages 23-24 describe payment alternatives and their market-structure implications.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 24–25, that reputation can discipline low-stakes conduct that no rational party would litigate. Mutual ratings expose drivers or passengers whose repeated messiness, distraction, aggression, or nonperformance would otherwise remain below any court threshold. This is significant because cheap reputational signatures transform dispersed minor breaches into a consequential repeat-player record. It connects to reputation systems, ratings, Uber, moral hazard, repeat play, private enforcement.

Reputation can discipline low-stakes conduct that no rational party would litigate This matters because cheap reputational signatures transform dispersed minor breaches into a consequential repeat-player record.

reputation systems
ratings
Uber
moral hazard
repeat play
private enforcement

Ratings can be biased, coercive, inaccurate, or vulnerable to platform manipulation even when they improve average behavior.

Pages 24-25 explain the role and evidence for reputation in small transactions.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 25, that platforms operate as corporate courthouses for more serious small-stakes disputes. Employees receive abbreviated submissions, issue refunds or sanctions quickly, and often favor consumers, trading procedure for speed while exposing the platform to regulatory and aggregate accountability. This is significant because private adjudication can make tiny claims actionable but concentrates procedural power in the intermediary. It connects to corporate courthouse, online dispute resolution, platform adjudication, refunds, procedural justice, regulatory accountability.

Platforms operate as corporate courthouses for more serious small-stakes disputes This matters because private adjudication can make tiny claims actionable but concentrates procedural power in the intermediary.

corporate courthouse
online dispute resolution
platform adjudication
refunds
procedural justice
regulatory accountability

Internal processes may be opaque, uneven, and structurally biased toward the platform's interests.

Page 25 describes in-house dispute resolution and its mixed institutional effects.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 26, that high-stakes harms arising from nano-contract breach can still trigger ordinary tort and court processes. A driver who violates a purchased right of way and causes a crash faces fault analysis analogous to disregarding an ordinary hand signal, even if the underlying payment was tiny. This is significant because nano private ordering supplements rather than wholly displaces public adjudication where consequences scale up. It connects to tort backstop, traffic accidents, breach, fault, public courts, hybrid governance.

High-stakes harms arising from nano-contract breach can still trigger ordinary tort and court processes This matters because nano private ordering supplements rather than wholly displaces public adjudication where consequences scale up.

tort backstop
traffic accidents
breach
fault
public courts
hybrid governance

The legal treatment of an automated priority bargain would depend on traffic statutes, safety policy, and jurisdiction.

Page 26 uses a crash after breach to show how macro harm restores ordinary legal process.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 26, that contract interpretation may become easier as transactional scope shrinks because potential interactions among terms fall superlinearly. A vending-machine-sized agreement presents fewer possible ambiguities than a merger, and courts can interpret surrounding human communications using familiar common-law methods. This is significant because digital code does not make meaning inaccessible, and nano scale can reduce rather than magnify interpretive complexity. It connects to contract interpretation, digital code, term interactions, transaction complexity, common law, smart contracts.

Contract interpretation may become easier as transactional scope shrinks because potential interactions among terms fall superlinearly This matters because digital code does not make meaning inaccessible, and nano scale can reduce rather than magnify interpretive complexity.

contract interpretation
digital code
term interactions
transaction complexity
common law
smart contracts

Tiny transactions can still involve hidden defaults, software defects, and unclear authorization.

Page 26 argues that small transactions produce small disagreement spaces and familiar interpretive questions.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 26–27, that platform responsibility, reputation, precautions, and escrow offer four complementary responses to nano enforcement costs. A platform can satisfy residual claims, ratings impose cheap sanctions, precharging avoids passenger nonpayment, and conditional release of funds links payment to performance. This is significant because effective enforcement can be engineered through ex ante control and repeat-play incentives rather than lawsuits over pennies. It connects to escrow, precautions, platform liability, reputation sanctions, prepayment, collection costs.

Platform responsibility, reputation, precautions, and escrow offer four complementary responses to nano enforcement costs This matters because effective enforcement can be engineered through ex ante control and repeat-play incentives rather than lawsuits over pennies.

escrow
precautions
platform liability
reputation sanctions
prepayment
collection costs

Escrow and code still require discretionary judgments about whether performance satisfied the contract.

Pages 26-27 list four enforcement strategies and acknowledge their limits.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 28–29, that queues are a large public-policy cost generated whenever demand exceeds service capacity. Waiting at roads, clinics, government offices, airports, and service counters consumes time, creates conflict, and substitutes social norms for explicit legal allocation. This is significant because routine delay aggregates into billions in lost value and deserves institutional analysis. It connects to queues, service capacity, waiting costs, road congestion, social norms, public policy.

Queues are a large public-policy cost generated whenever demand exceeds service capacity This matters because routine delay aggregates into billions in lost value and deserves institutional analysis.

queues
service capacity
waiting costs
road congestion
social norms
public policy

Dollar estimates of time costs depend on valuation assumptions and do not capture every social function of queues.

Pages 28-29 catalogue queues, their costs, and their norm-based governance.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 29–30, that queues allocate by willingness to wait rather than willingness to pay and tend to grow until waiting nearly consumes the good's value. Individuals join until marginal benefit approaches the time cost, producing a self-limiting but socially wasteful equilibrium. This is significant because a nominally free allocation mechanism still charges a real price in time. It connects to willingness to wait, willingness to pay, queue equilibrium, time price, scarcity, resource dissipation.

Queues allocate by willingness to wait rather than willingness to pay and tend to grow until waiting nearly consumes the good's value This matters because a nominally free allocation mechanism still charges a real price in time.

willingness to wait
willingness to pay
queue equilibrium
time price
scarcity
resource dissipation

Waiting may also screen commitment or preserve nonmarket values in particular domains.

Pages 29-30 apply Barzel's willingness-to-wait theory to ordinary lines.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 29–30, that first-in-line rules and limited priority exceptions poorly measure need, merit, or urgency. Reserved seats, appointments, triage, and VIP access modify FIFO around the edges, but each uses categories or discretion rather than direct, continuous comparison among users. This is significant because existing queues already mix chance, status, judgment, and price rather than embody a pure egalitarian principle. It connects to FIFO, triage, reserved priority, VIP lines, need, allocation heuristics.

First-in-line rules and limited priority exceptions poorly measure need, merit, or urgency This matters because existing queues already mix chance, status, judgment, and price rather than embody a pure egalitarian principle.

FIFO
triage
reserved priority
VIP lines
need
allocation heuristics

Categorical priority may be preferable where markets would corrupt the underlying good.

Pages 29-30 describe common modifications to first-come allocation.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 30–31, that moving a queue online can worsen allocation by eliminating the costly signal of physical waiting. When joining is nearly free, weakly interested buyers, scalpers, and bots can flood the line without adding service capacity, pushing out users with genuine need. This is significant because digitization removes inconvenience but may also remove information that made the original mechanism work. It connects to online queues, bots, scalpers, costly signals, service capacity, digital congestion.

Moving a queue online can worsen allocation by eliminating the costly signal of physical waiting This matters because digitization removes inconvenience but may also remove information that made the original mechanism work.

online queues
bots
scalpers
costly signals
service capacity
digital congestion

Identity controls, deposits, or anti-bot tools may restore some screening without physical waiting.

Pages 30-31 explain why virtual queues can inflate demand and distort priority.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 31, that the verification problem makes need-based priority costly, error-prone, and vulnerable to gaming. Triage requires staff, documentation, and discretionary judgment, can create another line, and rewards participants who learn how to exaggerate qualifying conditions. This is significant because administrative proof burdens consume resources and can reproduce inequality among claimants. It connects to verification problem, triage, administrative costs, gaming, discretion, organ allocation.

The verification problem makes need-based priority costly, error-prone, and vulnerable to gaming This matters because administrative proof burdens consume resources and can reproduce inequality among claimants.

verification problem
triage
administrative costs
gaming
discretion
organ allocation

Professional triage remains indispensable in domains where willingness to pay is normatively unacceptable.

Page 31 defines the verification problem and illustrates its costs and manipulation.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 31–32, that the grasshopper problem arises when accurate need verification rewards poor planning at the expense of prudent users. An airport may correctly recognize that a habitually late traveler will miss a flight, yet giving him priority makes others bear the cost of his avoidable urgency. This is significant because need at the moment of allocation does not reveal responsibility for creating that need. It connects to grasshopper problem, moral hazard, airport security, planning, triage, priority.

The grasshopper problem arises when accurate need verification rewards poor planning at the expense of prudent users This matters because need at the moment of allocation does not reveal responsibility for creating that need.

grasshopper problem
moral hazard
airport security
planning
triage
priority

Not every late arrival is culpable, and a system should distinguish unforeseeable emergency from repeated recklessness where possible.

Pages 31-32 define the grasshopper problem through the late-airport-traveler example.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 32–33, that peer-to-peer line trading can solve verification and grasshopper problems through voluntary compensated exchange. A claimant must back urgency with money or tokens, patient holders can refuse or accept compensation, and repeated lateness becomes costly rather than rewarded. This is significant because a price can simultaneously reveal intensity of preference and internalize the burden imposed on others. It connects to line trading, preference revelation, voluntary exchange, compensation, moral hazard, priority markets.

Peer-to-peer line trading can solve verification and grasshopper problems through voluntary compensated exchange This matters because a price can simultaneously reveal intensity of preference and internalize the burden imposed on others.

line trading
preference revelation
voluntary exchange
compensation
moral hazard
priority markets

Ability to pay and strategic behavior can distort willingness-to-pay as a measure of need.

Pages 32-33 explain the bilateral trading mechanism and its incentive effects.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 32, that a bilateral place swap is Pareto improving when it leaves intervening participants unaffected. The person later in line moves forward only by taking the consenting seller's exact place, so at least one party gains and neither trading party accepts a worse outcome. This is significant because careful transaction design can avoid imposing delay externalities on nonparties. It connects to Pareto improvement, bilateral swap, queue positions, third-party effects, voluntary trade, mechanism design.

A bilateral place swap is Pareto improving when it leaves intervening participants unaffected This matters because careful transaction design can avoid imposing delay externalities on nonparties.

Pareto improvement
bilateral swap
queue positions
third-party effects
voluntary trade
mechanism design

A leap to the front that pushes everyone back requires compensation to all affected waiters and is institutionally harder.

Page 32 distinguishes two-person swaps from front-of-line jumps with external effects.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 33–34, that peer-to-peer queue markets differ from existing priority products because compensation goes to those who wait rather than the controlling firm. Theme parks, venues, maître d's, and fixers already monetize priority, but their revenue incentives may encourage preservation of scarcity instead of shorter lines. This is significant because the recipient of a payment changes both distribution and the supplier's incentive to create congestion. It connects to priority products, Six Flags, VIP access, platform revenue, queue incentives, peer compensation.

Peer-to-peer queue markets differ from existing priority products because compensation goes to those who wait rather than the controlling firm This matters because the recipient of a payment changes both distribution and the supplier's incentive to create congestion.

priority products
Six Flags
VIP access
platform revenue
queue incentives
peer compensation

A p2p market may still require a platform that charges fees or shapes supply.

Pages 33-34 contrast line trading with firm-sold queue products.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 34, that priority tokens can preserve preference-based allocation without tying access directly to wealth. A fixed periodic endowment, like Kellogg course-bidding points, lets participants express relative need across occasions while preventing richer users from buying unlimited priority. This is significant because mechanism design can separate a market-like signal from cash distribution. It connects to priority tokens, course bidding, nonmonetary allocation, equity, budget constraints, preference intensity.

Priority tokens can preserve preference-based allocation without tying access directly to wealth This matters because mechanism design can separate a market-like signal from cash distribution.

priority tokens
course bidding
nonmonetary allocation
equity
budget constraints
preference intensity

Token design creates questions about allocation, transferability, secondary markets, and treatment of exceptional need.

Page 34 uses Northwestern course bidding to illustrate a noncash queue market.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 34–35, that experimental line behavior suggests payment offers verify urgency even when social norms prevent recipients from taking the money. Acceptance of line cutting rose with the offered amount, but most participants framed the act as a favor and refused payment, making the signal vulnerable if offers never need to be honored. This is significant because existing norms permit some priority exchange while suppressing the credible settlement that would discipline it. It connects to line experiments, social norms, credible offers, verification, favors, market formation.

Experimental line behavior suggests payment offers verify urgency even when social norms prevent recipients from taking the money This matters because existing norms permit some priority exchange while suppressing the credible settlement that would discipline it.

line experiments
social norms
credible offers
verification
favors
market formation

The field experiment involved limited locations and artificial approaches rather than an established automated market.

Pages 34-35 discuss Oberholzer-Gee's 500-person line experiment.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 35–36, that nano protocols can create a norm in which requesting priority is an ordinary transaction rather than an uncomfortable favor. Standardized anonymous exchange reduces interpersonal friction, hostility, and dependence on shameless line cutters while paying those who give time. This is significant because institutions do not merely lower transaction costs; they reshape the social meaning of exchange. It connects to norm creation, market design, anonymous exchange, favors, social friction, time markets.

Nano protocols can create a norm in which requesting priority is an ordinary transaction rather than an uncomfortable favor This matters because institutions do not merely lower transaction costs; they reshape the social meaning of exchange.

norm creation
market design
anonymous exchange
favors
social friction
time markets

Market normalization may also crowd out generosity and change relationships in objectionable ways.

Pages 35-36 explain why markets for time are rare and how nano contracts could change the governing norm.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 36–37, that Sandel's ethic of the queue does not justify a blanket separation of waiting and markets. In a society that permits firms to price underlying goods and already tolerates shipping upgrades, tolls, and VIP access, condemning only a separately traded place in line requires additional explanation. This is significant because normative scrutiny should focus on the good and institutional effects rather than assume waiting is intrinsically moral. It connects to Michael Sandel, queue ethic, market limits, willingness to pay, VIP access, commodification.

Sandel's ethic of the queue does not justify a blanket separation of waiting and markets This matters because normative scrutiny should focus on the good and institutional effects rather than assume waiting is intrinsically moral.

Michael Sandel
queue ethic
market limits
willingness to pay
VIP access
commodification

The article accepts that some goods are changed or corrupted by market allocation and does not reject all queue ethics.

Pages 36-37 present and criticize the general queue-ethic argument.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 37–39, that willingness to wait is not inherently more egalitarian than willingness to pay because free time is unequally distributed. Low-income workers, caregivers, tenants relying on public transit, and people navigating benefits may bear severe time poverty even if their market wage is low. This is significant because an ostensibly nonmonetary allocation rule can reproduce or worsen socioeconomic inequality. It connects to time poverty, willingness to wait, income inequality, caregiving, access to court, distribution.

Willingness to wait is not inherently more egalitarian than willingness to pay because free time is unequally distributed This matters because an ostensibly nonmonetary allocation rule can reproduce or worsen socioeconomic inequality.

time poverty
willingness to wait
income inequality
caregiving
access to court
distribution

Time and money burdens vary across populations, so neither metric is universally progressive.

Pages 37-39 challenge the assumption that queues favor poorer users and discuss legal-service examples.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 38–39, that voluntary line trading can be progressive by giving people the option to keep priority or monetize spare time. A person with limited means may earn from waiting, retain a place when urgent, or occasionally buy acceleration, gaining choices absent from a rigid queue. This is significant because distributional analysis must compare the market with the actual status quo rather than an imagined world of equal time. It connects to progressivity, choice, time monetization, low-income users, queue trading, comparative baseline.

Voluntary line trading can be progressive by giving people the option to keep priority or monetize spare time This matters because distributional analysis must compare the market with the actual status quo rather than an imagined world of equal time.

progressivity
choice
time monetization
low-income users
queue trading
comparative baseline

Choice is meaningful only if coercion, exclusion, and cumulative wealth-based delays remain controlled.

Pages 38-39 make the affirmative progressive case for nano queue contracts.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 39, that periodic tradable tokens can target access concerns better than the existing queue system. Policymakers could allocate noncash priority budgets to vulnerable users and permit exchange, combining a protected initial endowment with flexible use. This is significant because equity interventions can be built into the transactional medium rather than imposed only after unequal outcomes. It connects to tradable tokens, targeted redistribution, priority budgets, vulnerable users, platform design, access.

Periodic tradable tokens can target access concerns better than the existing queue system This matters because equity interventions can be built into the transactional medium rather than imposed only after unequal outcomes.

tradable tokens
targeted redistribution
priority budgets
vulnerable users
platform design
access

Token markets can develop unequal holdings and require rules against coercive transfer or speculation.

Page 39 proposes tokens as a targeted response to wealth-based priority.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 39–40, that nano queue markets should be restricted or banned for publicly provisioned and morally constitutive goods. Voting, organ transplants, jury service, disaster water, pandemic medicine, and adjudication embody prior decisions to allocate outside ordinary markets, and selling priority may express unequal worth or change the good itself. This is significant because the permissibility of a queue market depends on why society created the nonmarket allocation in the first place. It connects to public goods, voting, organ allocation, medical scarcity, inalienability, market corruption.

Nano queue markets should be restricted or banned for publicly provisioned and morally constitutive goods This matters because the permissibility of a queue market depends on why society created the nonmarket allocation in the first place.

public goods
voting
organ allocation
medical scarcity
inalienability
market corruption

Identifying the protected set and its boundaries requires contextual legislative and ethical judgment.

Pages 39-40 distinguish ordinary products from public or morally sensitive allocations.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 40, that regulation should target the supporting institutions of nano markets when anonymous individual trades are difficult to police. Payment rails, platforms, protocols, escrows, and standard-setting bodies are more visible control points than countless fleeting side deals. This is significant because the same infrastructure that solves formation and enforcement problems creates regulatory leverage. It connects to regulatory intermediaries, platform regulation, protocol governance, anonymous trading, enforcement, institutional design.

Regulation should target the supporting institutions of nano markets when anonymous individual trades are difficult to police This matters because the same infrastructure that solves formation and enforcement problems creates regulatory leverage.

regulatory intermediaries
platform regulation
protocol governance
anonymous trading
enforcement
institutional design

Decentralized protocols may resist control, and overbroad intermediary rules can suppress beneficial uses.

Page 40 connects practical constraints to the enforceability of market limits.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 41, that cloggers may create artificial scarcity by entering queues solely to collect payments from urgent users. Aimless drivers or strategic ticket holders impose delays on everyone and consume their own resources in hopes of extracting nano rents. This is significant because creating a price for delay can induce new supply of the very congestion the system seeks to allocate. It connects to clogging, rent seeking, artificial scarcity, queue manipulation, entry incentives, externalities.

Cloggers may create artificial scarcity by entering queues solely to collect payments from urgent users This matters because creating a price for delay can induce new supply of the very congestion the system seeks to allocate.

clogging
rent seeking
artificial scarcity
queue manipulation
entry incentives
externalities

Real participation costs and modest payments may keep widespread clogging unprofitable.

Page 41 introduces the clogger failure mode.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 41, that clogging is a manageable risk because participants bear real costs and keyhole rules can target strategic abuse. Airline bump compensation has not produced mass booking solely for payouts, and systems can exclude vehicles or accounts displaying hours of purposeless participation. This is significant because a specific failure mode does not justify rejecting the whole mechanism when narrow controls can address it. It connects to keyhole regulation, anti-abuse rules, airline overbooking, participation costs, cloggers, proportionality.

Clogging is a manageable risk because participants bear real costs and keyhole rules can target strategic abuse This matters because a specific failure mode does not justify rejecting the whole mechanism when narrow controls can address it.

keyhole regulation
anti-abuse rules
airline overbooking
participation costs
cloggers
proportionality

Novel markets may generate strategies unlike airline booking, so continued monitoring would be necessary.

Page 41 responds to the clogger objection with cost and targeted-regulation arguments.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 41, that nano queue contracts are generally promising but require limits, tokens, and attention to social norms. They can reward planning, compensate patience, and insure access during urgency while remaining inappropriate for protected public goods and vulnerable to congestion strategies. This is significant because the article's policy stance is selective regulation rather than technological laissez-faire or prohibition. It connects to selective regulation, queues, priority tokens, social norms, progressive design, public goods.

Nano queue contracts are generally promising but require limits, tokens, and attention to social norms This matters because the article's policy stance is selective regulation rather than technological laissez-faire or prohibition.

selective regulation
queues
priority tokens
social norms
progressive design
public goods

The conclusion is prospective and depends on real-world implementation and distributional evidence.

Page 41 synthesizes the ethical, efficiency, and regulatory assessment of nano lines.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 42–44, that nano leases can monetize enormous idle capacity in household and commercial assets. Cars, tools, rooms, bandwidth, clothing, computing power, storage, access paths, and fruit trees sit unused much of the time because ordinary transaction costs exceed the value of short access. This is significant because fragmented use rights can convert apparent waste into income and service without manufacturing another asset. It connects to idle capacity, nano leases, asset utilization, sharing economy, access rights, resource efficiency.

Nano leases can monetize enormous idle capacity in household and commercial assets This matters because fragmented use rights can convert apparent waste into income and service without manufacturing another asset.

idle capacity
nano leases
asset utilization
sharing economy
access rights
resource efficiency

Transport, peak demand, wear, monitoring, and unavoidable slack make full utilization neither possible nor always desirable.

Pages 42-44 quantify idle assets and list potential nano-leasing markets.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 42–44, that bandwidth sharing, food exchange, clothing rental, and drone passage illustrate diverse nano-lease forms. Helium sells moments of spare connectivity, Olio exposes surplus food distribution, Tulerie rents garments briefly, and automated drones could purchase narrow aerial passage from landowners. This is significant because the relevant asset may be excess capacity or a previously invisible fragment of exclusion rights. It connects to Helium, food sharing, clothing rental, drone airspace, bandwidth, fractional property.

Bandwidth sharing, food exchange, clothing rental, and drone passage illustrate diverse nano-lease forms This matters because the relevant asset may be excess capacity or a previously invisible fragment of exclusion rights.

Helium
food sharing
clothing rental
drone airspace
bandwidth
fractional property

Some examples are donations or platform services rather than pure p2p leases and serve as feasibility analogies.

Pages 42-44 develop concrete examples of nano leasing.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 44–45, that underutilization does not necessarily mean waste because slack, exclusive access, and personhood can themselves be valuable. A rarely used object may supply readiness, identity, control, or emotional continuity, and sharing can create transport, damage, privacy, and dispute costs. This is significant because utilization metrics alone cannot determine the welfare value of property. It connects to property and personhood, slack capacity, exclusive access, identity, sharing costs, autonomy.

Underutilization does not necessarily mean waste because slack, exclusive access, and personhood can themselves be valuable This matters because utilization metrics alone cannot determine the welfare value of property.

property and personhood
slack capacity
exclusive access
identity
sharing costs
autonomy

The importance of personhood varies by asset and owner, and the author resists extending the objection to all unused goods.

Pages 44-45 present practical and philosophical caveats to an idle-capacity account.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 45, that nano leasing can improve household liquidity for lessors and reduce ownership burdens for lessees. Owners can defray bills by monetizing idle assets, while users buy specialized access on demand without researching, maintaining, transporting, or financing a whole product. This is significant because small leases can redistribute both income and the cognitive work of ownership. It connects to household liquidity, access over ownership, specialization, maintenance, capital costs, consumer welfare.

Nano leasing can improve household liquidity for lessors and reduce ownership burdens for lessees This matters because small leases can redistribute both income and the cognitive work of ownership.

household liquidity
access over ownership
specialization
maintenance
capital costs
consumer welfare

Peer-to-peer rental can also induce additional asset purchases or commercial use, so net ownership effects are ambiguous.

Page 45 identifies distinct gains to lessors and lessees.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 45–46, that Product-as-a-Service demonstrates demand for use without ownership, while p2p nano leases decentralize the supplier side. Pay-per-use appliances and cloud storage replace durable purchases with continuous service, and a dense network of individual providers could extend the model to spatially local needs. This is significant because reliable access networks can make ownership unnecessary in the same way markets make carrying one's own production capacity unnecessary. It connects to Product as a Service, cloud storage, pay per use, peer supply, network density, ownership alternatives.

Product-as-a-Service demonstrates demand for use without ownership, while p2p nano leases decentralize the supplier side This matters because reliable access networks can make ownership unnecessary in the same way markets make carrying one's own production capacity unnecessary.

Product as a Service
cloud storage
pay per use
peer supply
network density
ownership alternatives

Continuous access requires sufficient network coverage, reliability, safety, and transaction governance.

Pages 45-46 connect PaaS and p2p nano leasing.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 46–49, that nano contracts suggest a further institutional move from property to contract. As fine-grained bargaining becomes cheap, governance once handled through broad exclusion and ownership can be replaced by temporary, tailored permissions among many users. This is significant because property's architecture is partly a response to information and transaction costs rather than a fixed natural form. It connects to property to contract, Demsetz, governance, right to exclude, fine-grained permissions, transaction costs.

Nano contracts suggest a further institutional move from property to contract This matters because property's architecture is partly a response to information and transaction costs rather than a fixed natural form.

property to contract
Demsetz
governance
right to exclude
fine-grained permissions
transaction costs

Some assets remain tied to personality, stability, and public regulation in ways that resist contractual decomposition.

Pages 46-49 frame the philosophical and jurisprudential transition from owning to leasing.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 47–48, that hyper-leasing may change the self and the social meaning of home, possession, and consumption. Turning a home into a recurring business space or treating all objects as trade goods can erode sanctuary, attachment, and the endowment effects associated with durable ownership. This is significant because legal form can reshape identity and valuation rather than merely allocate resources. It connects to ownership identity, home as sanctuary, endowment effect, hyper-leasing, personhood, social meaning.

Hyper-leasing may change the self and the social meaning of home, possession, and consumption This matters because legal form can reshape identity and valuation rather than merely allocate resources.

ownership identity
home as sanctuary
endowment effect
hyper-leasing
personhood
social meaning

The endowment-effect literature is contested, and many owners freely value income over exclusive possession.

Pages 47-48 discuss Hegelian autonomy, endowment effects, and Airbnb's effect on homes.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 48, that reduced ownership through nano leasing can align with anti-consumerist and environmental goals despite its profit motive. Sharing drills, tractors, and other goods can reduce overproduction and conspicuous consumption while allowing a less possession-centered life. This is significant because a market mechanism can sometimes advance values associated with critiques of private consumption. It connects to anti-consumerism, environmentalism, conspicuous consumption, resource sharing, overproduction, life as a service.

Reduced ownership through nano leasing can align with anti-consumerist and environmental goals despite its profit motive This matters because a market mechanism can sometimes advance values associated with critiques of private consumption.

anti-consumerism
environmentalism
conspicuous consumption
resource sharing
overproduction
life as a service

Nano markets can also concentrate capital and are not equivalent to communal or nonmarket property arrangements.

Page 48 connects high utilization with environmental and anti-consumerist thought.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 49–50, that nano leases collapse doctrinal distinctions among sales, leases, and licenses. Extremely short possession may be indistinguishable from exclusive use, revocation becomes meaningless over seconds, and bandwidth or picking rights do not fit Article 2's transfer-of-title framework. This is significant because categories built for durable goods and macro possession may misallocate jurisdiction, remedies, and default rules at nano scale. It connects to UCC Article 2, UCC Article 2A, leases, licenses, sales, possession.

Nano leases collapse doctrinal distinctions among sales, leases, and licenses This matters because categories built for durable goods and macro possession may misallocate jurisdiction, remedies, and default rules at nano scale.

UCC Article 2
UCC Article 2A
leases
licenses
sales
possession

Classification remains transaction-specific, and the article does not propose a complete replacement code.

Pages 49-50 show why current commercial-law categories and protections scale poorly.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 50–51, that commercializing excess capacity can shift costs to nonparticipants and communities. Bandwidth sharing may raise provider costs for every subscriber, and rotating users of apartments can burden elevators, noise levels, and neighborhood cohesion. This is significant because bilateral nano leases can create infrastructure and community externalities outside the contracting parties. It connects to cross-subsidies, bandwidth sharing, apartment capacity, community externalities, cost shifting, distribution.

Commercializing excess capacity can shift costs to nonparticipants and communities This matters because bilateral nano leases can create infrastructure and community externalities outside the contracting parties.

cross-subsidies
bandwidth sharing
apartment capacity
community externalities
cost shifting
distribution

Some sharing can instead reduce net capacity demand, as higher vehicle occupancy may lower congestion.

Pages 50-51 present ambiguous capacity and distribution effects.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 51, that upstream producers may use contract to prevent downstream nano leasing when shared use threatens sales or extracts rents. Internet providers can bar bandwidth resale and device manufacturers can restrict independent repair, reproducing conflicts over how far ownership rights survive private terms. This is significant because the same contractual technology that enables access can also close it through anticompetitive restrictions. It connects to downstream restrictions, right to repair, bandwidth terms, copyright contracts, producer control, right to nano lease.

Upstream producers may use contract to prevent downstream nano leasing when shared use threatens sales or extracts rents This matters because the same contractual technology that enables access can also close it through anticompetitive restrictions.

downstream restrictions
right to repair
bandwidth terms
copyright contracts
producer control
right to nano lease

A general right to nano lease would need to account for safety, network investment, intellectual property, and legitimate service limits.

Page 51 asks whether law should recognize a right to nano lease.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 51, that nano leasing has potentially large environmental and access benefits but ambiguous effects on autonomy, doctrine, and distribution. Greater utilization may reduce production and democratize access, yet communities can bear costs and a world of perpetual leasing may weaken stable ownership and self-definition. This is significant because policy should preserve choice while evaluating asset-specific spillovers and legal categories. It connects to environmental benefits, access, autonomy, distribution, short-term rentals, property doctrine.

Nano leasing has potentially large environmental and access benefits but ambiguous effects on autonomy, doctrine, and distribution This matters because policy should preserve choice while evaluating asset-specific spillovers and legal categories.

environmental benefits
access
autonomy
distribution
short-term rentals
property doctrine

The article offers a framework and cautions rather than a uniform regulatory prescription.

Page 51 synthesizes the policy assessment of nano leasing.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 52–53, that nano work can turn minutes of idle time and narrowly held skills into income-generating tasks. Commuters or people between appointments could label data, answer technical questions, monitor feeds, clean spaces, recharge scooters, or provide roadside help with little ongoing commitment. This is significant because the labor market may contain a large unused margin below the scale of ordinary gigs. It connects to nano gigs, idle time, on-demand labor, microtasks, specialized skills, income opportunities.

Nano work can turn minutes of idle time and narrowly held skills into income-generating tasks This matters because the labor market may contain a large unused margin below the scale of ordinary gigs.

nano gigs
idle time
on-demand labor
microtasks
specialized skills
income opportunities

Fragmented work can impose cognitive switching, surveillance, health, and quality costs not captured by gross opportunity.

Pages 52-53 describe possible nano jobs and their potential labor supply.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 52–54, that casual nano work can operate as an anti-poverty tool for people excluded from formal employment. Like bottle-return work, low-commitment tasks may provide flexible income without background checks, schedules, or conventional hiring barriers. This is significant because very small paid tasks can be socially important precisely for workers whose alternatives are scarce. It connects to anti-poverty, informal work, bottle returns, employment barriers, flexibility, labor inclusion.

Casual nano work can operate as an anti-poverty tool for people excluded from formal employment This matters because very small paid tasks can be socially important precisely for workers whose alternatives are scarce.

anti-poverty
informal work
bottle returns
employment barriers
flexibility
labor inclusion

Informal recycling also illustrates serious health and exploitation risks, and nano work is not automatically decent work.

Pages 52-54 connect flexible tasks with income opportunities for marginalized households.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 53, that regulatory arbitrage explains only part of the gig economy's value. Empirical work cited by the article finds platform workers earning about twenty-six percent more than their alternative opportunities, suggesting real matching or flexibility gains beyond evasion of taxi, hotel, and labor rules. This is significant because policy should not assume that every new contractual form survives solely by escaping regulation. It connects to regulatory arbitrage, gig wages, platform value, worker alternatives, empirical evidence, labor markets.

Regulatory arbitrage explains only part of the gig economy's value This matters because policy should not assume that every new contractual form survives solely by escaping regulation.

regulatory arbitrage
gig wages
platform value
worker alternatives
empirical evidence
labor markets

Results from existing gig platforms may not generalize to minute-scale nano work or establish effects on total welfare.

Page 53 contrasts the arbitrage critique with research on worker gains.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 53–54, that nano work intensifies the mismatch between employment protections and transactional classification. When a platform relationship lasts minutes, vacation, minimum wage, benefits, bargaining rights, and employee status become even harder to attach through rules built around durable employment. This is significant because continued downscaling may collapse employment into contract and bypass a century of worker protections. It connects to worker classification, employment law, minimum wage, benefits, precariat, platform labor.

Nano work intensifies the mismatch between employment protections and transactional classification This matters because continued downscaling may collapse employment into contract and bypass a century of worker protections.

worker classification
employment law
minimum wage
benefits
precariat
platform labor

The article does not reject worker protection but questions whether legacy status tests can carry the full burden.

Pages 53-54 discuss gig classification litigation and the greater challenge of nano engagements.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 54, that a broader social safety net may protect nano workers more effectively than forcing every fleeting task into a 1930s employment category. Universal basic income or status-independent benefits can follow people across fragmented engagements instead of depending on whether a minutes-long relation counts as employment. This is significant because labor protection may need to attach to persons rather than jobs when work is radically modular. It connects to universal basic income, portable benefits, social insurance, employment status, labor law, nano work.

A broader social safety net may protect nano workers more effectively than forcing every fleeting task into a 1930s employment category This matters because labor protection may need to attach to persons rather than jobs when work is radically modular.

universal basic income
portable benefits
social insurance
employment status
labor law
nano work

The paper sketches this direction without comparing costs, political feasibility, or alternative portable-benefit designs.

Page 54 proposes adapting the social net regardless of formal employment status.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 54–55, that turning every idle moment into paid work can shrink the autonomous space of leisure and selfhood. If commuters and people between meetings are continually offered tasks, market discipline can extend beyond the workplace through self-imposed pressure to monetize time. This is significant because labor utilization is not an unqualified good when idleness and caprice are part of human freedom. It connects to leisure, autonomy, self-exploitation, burnout, labor utilization, commodification of time.

Turning every idle moment into paid work can shrink the autonomous space of leisure and selfhood This matters because labor utilization is not an unqualified good when idleness and caprice are part of human freedom.

leisure
autonomy
self-exploitation
burnout
labor utilization
commodification of time

For people excluded from stable work, voluntary short engagements can be life-changing rather than oppressive.

Pages 54-55 present the philosophical concern about work consuming the space of self.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 55, that nano gigs combine unmatched flexibility and inclusion with severe risks to worker rights and boundaries. They may help caregivers, seasonal workers, graduates, and others use otherwise idle time, yet make employment status, benefits, inequality, and separation between work and life harder to protect. This is significant because the labor application presents the paper's clearest collision between transactional freedom and status-based safeguards. It connects to labor flexibility, worker rights, work-life boundaries, caregivers, employment status, inequality.

Nano gigs combine unmatched flexibility and inclusion with severe risks to worker rights and boundaries This matters because the labor application presents the paper's clearest collision between transactional freedom and status-based safeguards.

labor flexibility
worker rights
work-life boundaries
caregivers
employment status
inequality

The article leaves the institutional balance for future labor-policy development.

Page 55 synthesizes the promise and peril of nano work.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 55–56, that tort law governs accidents largely because transaction costs prevent potential injurers and victims from bargaining in advance. Economic tort theory approximates the bargain that farmers and railroads would reach if they could costlessly negotiate over sparks, care, and expected harm. This is significant because reducing bargaining costs can move interactions from nonconsensual tort governance toward contract. It connects to Coase theorem, tort law, transaction costs, accidents, missing markets, efficient bargaining.

Tort law governs accidents largely because transaction costs prevent potential injurers and victims from bargaining in advance This matters because reducing bargaining costs can move interactions from nonconsensual tort governance toward contract.

Coase theorem
tort law
transaction costs
accidents
missing markets
efficient bargaining

Tort law also serves corrective justice, expressive, administrative, and distributive functions beyond the economic account emphasized here.

Pages 55-56 introduce the Coasean basis for nano accident contracts.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 56–57, that a real-time reverse auction can direct inevitable harm toward the party able to bear it at the lowest private cost. Corn and soybean farmers bid the compensation they would accept for sparks, allowing the train to preserve the more valuable crop and pay the lower-loss owner before harm occurs. This is significant because advance contractual valuation can outperform a court that estimates damages only after the physical choice is irreversible. It connects to reverse auctions, railroad sparks, harm minimization, victim valuation, real-time bargaining, Coasean contracts.

A real-time reverse auction can direct inevitable harm toward the party able to bear it at the lowest private cost This matters because advance contractual valuation can outperform a court that estimates damages only after the physical choice is irreversible.

reverse auctions
railroad sparks
harm minimization
victim valuation
real-time bargaining
Coasean contracts

The example requires automated communication, informed bidding, predictable harm, and a high degree of stylization.

Pages 56-57 develop the corn-and-soybean nano auction.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 57, that negotiated accident compensation can exceed tort damages while saving the more valuable asset. The lower-loss farmer may accept an amount above actual damage but below the alternative farmer's loss, producing gains for the victim and the train relative to uncertain litigation. This is significant because private valuation can support both efficiency and progressive distribution when victims are poorer or collection is difficult. It connects to victim compensation, tort damages, distribution, private valuation, judgment evasion, surplus sharing.

Negotiated accident compensation can exceed tort damages while saving the more valuable asset This matters because private valuation can support both efficiency and progressive distribution when victims are poorer or collection is difficult.

victim compensation
tort damages
distribution
private valuation
judgment evasion
surplus sharing

Bargaining power, information asymmetry, and monopoly can alter how the surplus is divided.

Page 57 compares the auction payment with conventional compensatory damages.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 57, that background tort law prevents accident victims from extracting unlimited monopoly prices. If bargaining fails, the train may choose a field and owe court-assessed harm, giving both sides an outside option that bounds the nano negotiation. This is significant because public default rules can enable a voluntary market by constraining holdout power. It connects to tort default, outside options, bilateral monopoly, holdout, bargaining range, hybrid governance.

Background tort law prevents accident victims from extracting unlimited monopoly prices This matters because public default rules can enable a voluntary market by constraining holdout power.

tort default
outside options
bilateral monopoly
holdout
bargaining range
hybrid governance

Court damages remain noisy, biased, delayed, and sometimes uncollectible, so the bound is imperfect.

Page 57 explains how tort liability backstops rather than disappears under nano contracting.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 57–58, that repeated nano accident payments can induce efficient land use and precaution over time. A farmer near an accident-prone track may stop planting and sell a safe discharge option, while predictable costs give railroads reason to invest in anti-spark technology. This is significant because a seemingly perverse choice to leave land idle can efficiently create accident capacity and improve prevention incentives. It connects to dynamic incentives, land use, precaution, safe zones, railroad technology, expected accidents.

Repeated nano accident payments can induce efficient land use and precaution over time This matters because a seemingly perverse choice to leave land idle can efficiently create accident capacity and improve prevention incentives.

dynamic incentives
land use
precaution
safe zones
railroad technology
expected accidents

The desirability depends on accurate pricing and the absence of broader food, environmental, or community externalities.

Pages 57-58 analyze long-run farmer and railroad responses.