Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 58, that contractualizing bodily harm may violate deep moral norms even if property-damage bargains are efficient. The acceptability of selling exposure to trespass or crop damage does not imply that people should auction physical injury, life, or dignity. This is significant because lower transaction costs do not eliminate inalienability or the moral limits of markets. It connects to bodily harm, inalienability, commodification, property damage, trespass, moral limits.

Contractualizing bodily harm may violate deep moral norms even if property-damage bargains are efficient This matters because lower transaction costs do not eliminate inalienability or the moral limits of markets.

bodily harm
inalienability
commodification
property damage
trespass
moral limits

The paper flags the boundary but does not offer a comprehensive taxonomy of permissible accident contracts.

Page 58 limits the accident proposal by reference to bodily harm and queue commodification concerns.


Yonathan A. Arbel, On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts, 37 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 151 (2023).

Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 58, that nano contracting can implement Coasean harm minimization while leaving distribution adjustable through the tort baseline. Parties select the least costly unavoidable accident and agree on compensation, while lawmakers can change outside options through liability rules if society dislikes the distribution. This is significant because efficiency-producing private bargains and public distributive policy need not be treated as mutually exclusive. It connects to Coasean bargaining, tort baselines, distribution, harm minimization, private ordering, legal defaults.

Nano contracting can implement Coasean harm minimization while leaving distribution adjustable through the tort baseline This matters because efficiency-producing private bargains and public distributive policy need not be treated as mutually exclusive.

Coasean bargaining
tort baselines
distribution
harm minimization
private ordering
legal defaults

Transaction costs never reach zero, and bargaining systems themselves require infrastructure, safeguards, and enforcement.

Page 58 summarizes the institutional relation between nano contracts and tort law.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on pages 58–59, that nano contracts should be judged by the traffic jams created by existing trends, not dismissed as science fiction or renamed ordinary contracts. Digitization, XaaS, tokenization, and shrinking transaction costs already point toward smaller bargains whose downstream congestion, inequality, and category failures deserve advance study. This is significant because the analytical contribution lies in tracing second-order consequences of scale rather than claiming a precise technological forecast. It connects to science fiction, technology forecasting, second-order effects, XaaS, tokenization, transaction scale.

Nano contracts should be judged by the traffic jams created by existing trends, not dismissed as science fiction or renamed ordinary contracts This matters because the analytical contribution lies in tracing second-order consequences of scale rather than claiming a precise technological forecast.

science fiction
technology forecasting
second-order effects
XaaS
tokenization
transaction scale

The article does not predict adoption rates, technical specifications, or a single net-welfare result.

Pages 58-59 explain the automobile-versus-traffic-jam framing of the project.


Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “On the Scales of Private Law: Nano Contracts” on page 59, that smaller transactions can be simultaneously liberating and uncanny, and the legal response is a choice rather than an inevitable consequence of technology. Clearing queues, reducing ownership burdens, and opening jobs coexist with unequal priority, possessionless life, totalized work, and objectionable markets in voting or bodily harm. This is significant because scale analysis supplies a common lens for contract, property, employment, and tort policy before market practices harden. It connects to legal foresight, private law boundaries, liberation, market limits, social values, institutional choice.

Smaller transactions can be simultaneously liberating and uncanny, and the legal response is a choice rather than an inevitable consequence of technology This matters because scale analysis supplies a common lens for contract, property, employment, and tort policy before market practices harden.

legal foresight
private law boundaries
liberation
market limits
social values
institutional choice

Reasonable observers can disagree in good faith about whether the net effects are positive or negative.

Page 59 closes by juxtaposing nano contracts' promise and peril and calling for anticipatory scholarship.