paper_title: Slicing Defamation by Contract

authors: Yonathan A. Arbel

citation: Yonathan A. Arbel, Slicing Defamation by Contract, U. Chi. L. Rev. Online (Mar. 30, 2020).

source_type: published essay PDF

section: Abstract

claim: The granularity of legal rights and duties is a design variable that can change behavior and policy outcomes

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on page 1, that Lee Anne Fennell’s distinction between slices and lumps supplies a general method for legal design. Rights need not always be allocated in all-or-nothing blocks; varying their scale, increments, or continuity can change incentives and open intermediate choices. The essay applies that method as a thought experiment in contracts and defamation. This is significant because legal architecture can matter independently of the nominal entitlement. It connects to Slices and Lumps, entitlement design, granularity, nonlinear effects, mechanism design, and institutional choice.

significance: The framing treats divisibility as an underused regulatory lever rather than a fixed feature of doctrine.

connections:
Slices and Lumps
entitlement design
granularity
nonlinear effects
mechanism design
institutional choice

limitations: The short symposium essay presents a quasi-policy proposal and expressly cannot address every objection or implementation detail.

evidence_summary: The abstract invokes Fennell’s framework and proposes analyzing defamation through the optimization of legal lumpiness.

review_status: machine-drafted-source-checked


section: Abstract and Introduction

claim: Defamation tort liability is comparatively lumpy, while contract offers a scalpel for creating tailored, voluntary exposure

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on pages 1–2, that tort law typically assigns a binary wrong and the full associated damages, whereas contract permits parties to assemble obligations from a broad menu and in fine increments. Applying contractual granularity to defamation could better calibrate liability to individual stories than a categorical expansion of media tort exposure. This is significant because it proposes a different institutional technology for regulating false speech. It connects to tort-contract boundaries, freedom of contract, tailored liability, defamation, binary rules, and private ordering.

significance: The comparison explains why the essay looks to contract doctrine for an intermediate response to fake news and reputational harm.

connections:
tort-contract boundaries
freedom of contract
tailored liability
defamation
binary rules
private ordering

limitations: Contractual slicing depends on voluntary adoption and enforceability and cannot itself reach every harmful speaker or compensate every victim.

evidence_summary: The opening contrasts tort’s hammer with contract’s scalpel and proposes slicing defamation through voluntary obligations.


section: The Mermelstein Example

claim: Mel Mermelstein’s enforcement of a Holocaust-denial reward shows that private liability can puncture false credibility when defamation law offers no group remedy

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on page 2, that the Institute for Historical Review tried to lend credibility to Holocaust denial by offering $50,000 for contrary proof. Survivor Mel Mermelstein supplied evidence, sued when payment was refused, and obtained a $90,000 settlement and apology. Because defamation generally does not protect groups, the contractual reward created an otherwise missing consequence and stripped away the organization’s pseudo-academic veneer. This is significant because voluntary exposure converted cheap talk into a falsifiable commitment. It connects to unilateral contracts, Holocaust denial, prove-me-wrong offers, group defamation, credibility, and truth vindication.

significance: The example demonstrates both the expressive and informational force of enforcing a publicly offered falsification prize.

connections:
unilateral contracts
Holocaust denial
prove-me-wrong offers
group defamation
credibility
truth vindication

limitations: The case involved an extreme, demonstrably false claim and a highly motivated claimant, so ordinary reporting disputes may be harder to resolve.

evidence_summary: The essay recounts the IHR offer, Mermelstein’s evidence and lawsuit, the settlement and apology, and the resulting loss of credibility.


claim: Liability can lend credibility to speech because a speaker signals confidence by accepting verification and consequences for falsity

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on page 2, that costless assertions are cheap talk: an audience has difficulty separating truth from fabrication when lying carries no penalty. A speaker who voluntarily exposes a claim to testing and a meaningful payout purchases credibility at the risk of falsification. Enforcement then helps vindicate truth publicly when the wager is lost. This is significant because defamation liability has an underappreciated audience-facing benefit in addition to deterrence and compensation. It connects to costly signaling, cheap talk, audience belief, falsifiability, bonded claims, and information economics.

significance: The proposition explains why assuming liability can be valuable to a truthful speaker rather than merely burdensome.

connections:
costly signaling
cheap talk
audience belief
falsifiability
bonded claims
information economics

limitations: Liability is only a credible signal if audiences understand it and expect the promise to be funded, adjudicated, and enforced.

evidence_summary: The Mermelstein discussion explicitly links exposure to verification and repercussions with increased or lost credibility.


section: Defamation’s Functions

claim: Defamation law protects through deterrence, compensation, and public vindication, while constitutional doctrine balances those benefits against speech and press freedom

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on pages 2–3, that traditional defamation serves three channels: it deters false derogatory speech, redresses injury, and provides a forum for truth vindication. New York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny limit those protections, especially for speech about public figures, because reputation must be balanced against constitutional freedom. This is significant because any reform should identify which functions it preserves and what expressive costs it imposes. It connects to actual malice, New York Times v. Sullivan, reputation, compensatory damages, truth vindication, and First Amendment balancing.

significance: The functional inventory provides the benchmark against which truth bounties and expanded tort liability are compared.

connections:
actual malice
New York Times v. Sullivan
reputation
compensatory damages
truth vindication
First Amendment balancing

limitations: The essay gives a compressed account of a complex constitutional and common-law field and focuses principally on media speech.

evidence_summary: The third page identifies three protective channels and situates Sullivan as the balance producing broad but qualified media protection.


section: The Reform Problem

claim: Across-the-board expansion of defamation liability would chill press freedom and may worsen the information environment

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on page 3, that calls to revisit Sullivan, restate defamation doctrine, and strengthen recourse for fake news respond to real concerns but exact a serious price. Tighter judicial control increases expected publication costs, chills speech and reporting, and may even amplify harmful falsehoods through audience inferences. This is significant because accountability reform cannot be evaluated solely by the compensation it promises. It connects to fake news, chilling effects, media liability, doctrinal expansion, marketplace of ideas, and unintended consequences.

significance: The warning motivates a less sweeping method of adding credibility and falsity costs without changing tort exposure for every story.

connections:
fake news
chilling effects
media liability
doctrinal expansion
marketplace of ideas
unintended consequences

limitations: The essay does not quantitatively compare the deterrence, compensation, or error costs of particular proposed defamation reforms.

evidence_summary: The author identifies contemporary expansion proposals and argues that strict liability pressures speech, press, liberty, and possibly truth itself.


section: Truth Bounty Proposal

claim: A truth bounty is a voluntary contractual reward payable to any member of the public who substantially falsifies a designated story under specified procedures

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on pages 3–4, that a journal or journalist could attach a bonded dollar amount to a report and promise it to whoever meets an established falsification standard. The bounty is story-specific and open to the public. Critically, it supplements whatever current defamation liability already exists and is offered as an alternative only to proposals for expanding media tort liability. This is significant because it creates adjustable accountability without taking existing remedies from victims. It connects to unilateral offers, prizes, falsification procedures, media bonds, supplemental remedies, and voluntary liability.

significance: The definition draws the proposal’s key boundary and distinguishes it from tort preemption or compulsory deregulation.

connections:
unilateral offers
prizes
falsification procedures
media bonds
supplemental remedies
voluntary liability

limitations: The meaning of substantial falsification, proof standards, forum, claimant priority, and funding must be standardized for reliable use.

evidence_summary: The article defines the device, its public claimant class, its procedural premise, and its additive relationship to existing law.


claim: A concise notation such as “T.B. $50,000” can incorporate a standardized truth-bounty procedure the way trade abbreviations invoke complex legal terms

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on page 4, that implementation should borrow from UCC and Incoterms shorthand. A designated code plus a dollar amount beside a story would communicate assent to the full off-the-shelf procedural regime and allow any successful falsifier to claim the stated sum. This is significant because reducing drafting, interpretation, and print-space costs makes fine-grained liability usable at publication scale. It connects to incorporated terms, Incoterms, UCC shorthand, standardization, modular contracting, and transaction costs.

significance: The notation translates a complex legal instrument into a cheap editorial choice that can be varied story by story.

connections:
incorporated terms
Incoterms
UCC shorthand
standardization
modular contracting
transaction costs

limitations: The shorthand works only after law or practice supplies clear incorporated procedures and audiences learn its meaning.

evidence_summary: The fourth page analogizes the proposed T.B. notation to standardized commercial abbreviations and illustrates it beside a news story.


claim: Truth bounties function as warranties of truth that let outlets buy credibility and readership by staking money on reporting quality

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on page 4, that a bounty resembles a product warranty, except that the warranted attribute is the truth of a report rather than the performance of a machine. Editors would choose the amount based on source confidence, editorial rigor, and commercial considerations, and credible outlets could distinguish themselves from unreliable ones. This is significant because voluntary liability becomes a competitive quality signal rather than only a sanction. It connects to warranties, bonding, media competition, product differentiation, editorial confidence, and readership markets.

significance: The proposal gives outlets an affirmative business reason to accept exposure: credibility itself has economic value.

connections:
warranties
bonding
media competition
product differentiation
editorial confidence
readership markets

limitations: Commercial value may not cover the expected bounty and administrative cost for every outlet, story, or audience.

evidence_summary: The essay expressly compares the device to a warranty of truth and ties bounty choice to editorial confidence and market factors.


claim: A low or absent bounty becomes informative in a mature bounty market because deviation signals weak confidence and reduces reputational harm

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on pages 4–5, that nominal bounties are not necessarily a loophole once meaningful bounties become customary. An editor who stakes little visibly separates the story from well-bonded reporting and alerts audiences that it may be tentative, poorly researched, or sensational. The reduced audience credence takes much of the sting from the allegation without a victim lawsuit. This is significant because even nonparticipation can discipline through equilibrium comparison. It connects to separating equilibria, off-equilibrium signals, audience discounting, tabloid journalism, reputational harm, and social norms.

significance: The model extracts information from bounty size rather than requiring regulators to set one mandatory liability level.

connections:
separating equilibria
off-equilibrium signals
audience discounting
tabloid journalism
reputational harm
social norms

limitations: The result depends on broad adoption, audience sophistication, and resistance to cheap mimicry or strategic manipulation.

evidence_summary: The fourth and fifth pages explain why a nominal bounty would reveal low confidence and lead audiences to discount the publication.


section: Feasibility and Incentives

claim: Voluntary truth bounties are plausible because media outlets already assume legal risk and value credibility enough to suppress stories

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on page 5, that publishers do not operate in a zero-liability world. Every potentially false report creates some defamation exposure, and interviews indicate editors already withhold stories to protect institutional reputation. A bounty converts part of that environment into a deliberate instrument whose risk can be set in advance and whose credibility benefit can attract readers. This is significant because voluntary exposure is an extension of existing editorial tradeoffs, not wholly alien behavior. It connects to editorial judgment, expected liability, self-censorship, brand value, risk management, and voluntary bonding.

significance: The feasibility argument answers the intuition that no rational publisher would ever agree to pay for being proven wrong.

connections:
editorial judgment
expected liability
self-censorship
brand value
risk management
voluntary bonding

limitations: The essay offers interviews and incentive logic rather than observed widespread publisher adoption of truth bounties.

evidence_summary: The fifth page contrasts the proposal with publishers’ existing exposure and stated concern for reputational credibility.


claim: A story-specific bounty replaces uncertain, potentially massive marginal exposure with a bespoke and known amount

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on page 5, that tort damages depend on difficult predictions about lost business, emotional injury, punitive awards, and the claimant’s legal status. Media organizations nevertheless publish under that indeterminate tail risk. A truth bounty lets an editor state a fixed story-level amount tied to confidence while retaining current background tort rules. This is significant because priceable exposure can support more precise editorial decisions than unknown all-or-nothing damages. It connects to uncertainty, punitive damages, bespoke risk, loss distribution, editorial screening, and liability caps.

significance: The instrument’s attraction lies partly in converting one dimension of accountability into a transparent, chosen quantity.

connections:
uncertainty
punitive damages
bespoke risk
loss distribution
editorial screening
liability caps

limitations: Existing tort exposure remains and the bounty adds to it, so the outlet’s total risk is not fully capped or known.

evidence_summary: The article contrasts difficult-to-forecast defamation recovery with a bounty amount selected before publication.


section: Social Case: Signaling

claim: Bounty size can communicate a publisher’s private information about source quality and editorial rigor more precisely than the binary decision to publish

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on page 5, that editors know facts audiences cannot observe: how many sources were consulted, their reliability and motives, the depth of verification, and the pressure of timing. Publication itself signals some confidence because it carries risk, but it is only a coarse yes-or-no signal. A graded bounty lets the outlet put more or less money behind each story. This is significant because liability granularity can transmit otherwise hidden quality information. It connects to asymmetric information, costly signals, source verification, editorial process, Bayesian audiences, and quality disclosure.

significance: The mechanism aligns the legal slice with the editor’s story-specific confidence instead of treating all publications alike.

connections:
asymmetric information
costly signals
source verification
editorial process
Bayesian audiences
quality disclosure

limitations: The signal separates quality only if bounty costs correlate with truth confidence and if low-quality outlets cannot imitate high bounties without consequence.

evidence_summary: The essay lists private editorial inputs and argues that a variable financial stake improves on the binary signal created by publication.


section: Social Case: Crowdsourcing

claim: Opening the bounty to anyone crowdsources falsification by rewarding people with private exonerating evidence

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on pages 5–6, that a target is often well positioned to prove innocence, but a bystander, clerk, camera holder, or participant may possess decisive evidence the target lacks. Making every member of the public eligible gives otherwise passive witnesses a financial reason to disclose an alibi, contradiction, or contextual fact. This is significant because distributed information can be assembled after publication rather than requiring the newsroom to find every fact beforehand. It connects to crowdsourcing, private information, whistleblowing, prizes, distributed verification, and evidence production.

significance: The bounty turns audience members from passive recipients into potential investigators and suppliers of truth.

connections:
crowdsourcing
private information
whistleblowing
prizes
distributed verification
evidence production

limitations: Rewards may induce strategic, duplicative, misleading, or privacy-invasive submissions and require a trustworthy adjudication process.

evidence_summary: The article provides alibi and relationship examples to show how non-target witnesses may hold information capable of substantial falsification.


section: Social Case: Victim Protection

claim: Truth bounties protect targets through public vindication, production of exonerating evidence, and ex ante deterrence, but do not directly replace compensatory damages

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on page 6, that a successfully claimed and publicized bounty corrects audience belief and clears the target’s name. The reward can bring forward witnesses whose evidence the target could not otherwise obtain, and the prospect of exposure discourages wrongful publication initially. The target may not receive the money, however, unlike a plaintiff awarded tort damages. This is significant because the device is strongest on deterrence and truth vindication and weaker on redress. It connects to corrective publicity, victim compensation, deterrence, exoneration, remedial pluralism, and reputational repair.

significance: The comparison maps the bounty onto defamation’s functions without pretending it duplicates all of them.

connections:
corrective publicity
victim compensation
deterrence
exoneration
remedial pluralism
reputational repair

limitations: A victim may remain uncompensated for economic and emotional injury, and the first claimant could be someone else unless sharing rules are adopted.

evidence_summary: The sixth page identifies three protective channels while expressly noting that the target does not necessarily receive the bounty.


section: Social Case: Publication

claim: Granular bounties preserve intermediate publication choices that expanded, all-or-nothing tort liability would suppress

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on page 6, that a publisher facing unknown full damages must choose between assuming the entire lumpy risk and abandoning a story. Some marginal reports—possibly including early allegations against powerful serial abusers—would be socially valuable despite lower confidence. A smaller story-specific bounty lets the outlet publish tentatively while communicating the uncertainty. This is significant because liability scale affects not only falsehoods but which true or important claims enter public debate. It connects to investigative journalism, marginal publication, option sets, uncertainty communication, all-or-nothing choices, and public-interest reporting.

significance: The slicing argument protects a middle category between fully bonded assertion and complete silence.

connections:
investigative journalism
marginal publication
option sets
uncertainty communication
all-or-nothing choices
public-interest reporting

limitations: Publishing lower-confidence allegations can seriously harm innocent targets, and the essay does not specify the socially optimal bounty for such stories.

evidence_summary: The author applies Fennell’s account of lumpy choices to stories that would be abandoned if expected liability were only slightly higher.


claim: For marginal stories that are published, a low bounty may harm the target less than expanded tort exposure because audiences assign the story less credibility

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on pages 6–7, that the reputational effect of an allegation depends partly on the liability behind it. A story published under large mandatory tort exposure may look highly credible because the outlet risked so much; the same speculative claim carrying a visibly low bounty warns audiences to discount it. This does not eliminate target harm but can reduce it. This is significant because stronger liability can nonlinearly increase the very reputational injury it seeks to redress. It connects to audience inference, legal endogeneity, credibility effects, speculative reporting, Bayesian updating, and reputational damages.

significance: The argument identifies a feedback effect overlooked by linear assumptions about more liability and more protection.

connections:
audience inference
legal endogeneity
credibility effects
speculative reporting
Bayesian updating
reputational damages

limitations: The comparison depends on audiences observing and interpreting legal exposure, and a low-bounty allegation may still spread widely and cause serious harm.

evidence_summary: The transition from page six to seven argues that expanded tort’s larger stake can make a published story more credible than a low-bounty version.


section: Case Against Expanded Tort Liability

claim: Voluntary truth bounties can add accountability with less chilling of press freedom than mandatory expansion of defamation law

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on page 7, that strict defamation regimes can generate libel tourism and deter publication, imposing costs on the marketplace of ideas and basic liberties. A publisher-chosen bounty adds falsity exposure where the outlet seeks credibility but does not force the same liability on every report. This is significant because the relevant comparison is not bounty versus perfect victim protection, but bounty versus a broad tort expansion that burdens speech. It connects to libel tourism, freedom of the press, chilling effects, voluntary accountability, comparative institutional analysis, and marketplace of ideas.

significance: The strongest affirmative case for the device rests on avoiding the constitutional and informational costs of the proposed alternative.

connections:
libel tourism
freedom of the press
chilling effects
voluntary accountability
comparative institutional analysis
marketplace of ideas

limitations: Voluntary adoption may be sparse, and retaining current law means some false and harmful statements remain beyond effective redress.

evidence_summary: The seventh page contrasts strict English-style liability and publisher avoidance with the more tailored exposure of optional bounties.


claim: Expanded lumpy defamation exposure would impose disproportionate anticompetitive burdens on small outlets and investigative reporting

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on page 7, that unknown full damages and punitive awards are more difficult for small or shallow-pocket publishers to absorb than for established media firms. Across-the-board expansion can therefore chill precisely the investigative and entrant reporting needed for pluralism, while large incumbents retain greater legal and financial capacity. This is significant because liability rules can reshape media-market structure as well as story accuracy. It connects to anticompetitive regulation, media concentration, investigative journalism, shallow pockets, entry barriers, and asymmetric compliance costs.

significance: The distributional effect on publishers strengthens the case for adjustable rather than uniform additional liability.

connections:
anticompetitive regulation
media concentration
investigative journalism
shallow pockets
entry barriers
asymmetric compliance costs

limitations: A voluntary bounty market can also favor wealthy outlets able to post larger stakes and thereby purchase stronger credibility.

evidence_summary: The essay specifically identifies smaller outlets and investigative reporting as especially burdened by lumpy expansion.


section: Additional Benefits

claim: A mature bounty practice could produce a separating equilibrium between high-quality reporting and infotainment

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on page 7, that consistent use of meaningful bounties by rigorous outlets and small or absent stakes on unreliable stories would make source quality easier to distinguish. Readers could compare not only brands but the monetary confidence attached to particular reports. The equilibrium turns liability choice into a visible dimension of journalistic product quality. This is significant because improved source sorting can discipline misinformation without adjudicating every statement first. It connects to separating equilibria, media literacy, quality tiers, infotainment, market signaling, and source credibility.

significance: The benefit operates at the outlet and ecosystem level, beyond deterrence of any single false story.

connections:
separating equilibria
media literacy
quality tiers
infotainment
market signaling
source credibility

limitations: Pooling, audience inattention, subsidized propaganda, or strategic overbonding could prevent clean separation.

evidence_summary: The author predicts that common bounties would make reliable reportive journalism more distinguishable from infotainment.


claim: Escrow, bonds, or insurance can make a truth bounty credible even when the publisher has shallow pockets

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on page 7, that a promised reward conveys little if the outlet cannot pay after falsification. Funding the obligation through escrow, surety, or insurance can separate the signal from uncertain publisher wealth and overcome judgment-proofness. Third-party backing also makes the stated amount a more comparable measure of exposure. This is significant because financial assurance is part of the information design, not merely a collection remedy. It connects to escrow, surety bonds, insurance, judgment proofing, secured promises, and signal credibility.

significance: The proposal anticipates a capital-structure problem that would otherwise make identical nominal bounties convey different information.

connections:
escrow
surety bonds
insurance
judgment proofing
secured promises
signal credibility

limitations: Assurance creates premiums and administrative costs, and wealthier publishers may still afford larger credible bounties.

evidence_summary: The seventh page proposes escrow, bonds, or insurance as solutions to shallow-pocket nonpayment and wealth-dependent credibility.


section: Enforceability

claim: Truth bounties face a consideration objection because a successful falsifier may neither purchase the publication nor confer a conventional benefit on the offeror

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on pages 7–8, that prove-me-wrong contracts sit uneasily with some accounts of consideration. Unlike the claimant in Carlill’s product-warranty setting, any member of the public could claim a truth bounty without buying the newspaper or relying on the story. A court might therefore say the publisher receives no bargained-for benefit from being disproved. This is significant because signaling value is useless if the promised liability is legally illusory. It connects to consideration, unilateral contracts, Carlill, bargain theory, public offers, and contractual enforceability.

significance: The essay identifies doctrinal enforceability as a leading reason the apparently useful instrument is not already common.

connections:
consideration
unilateral contracts
Carlill
bargain theory
public offers
contractual enforceability

limitations: Consideration doctrine varies and courts may characterize induced investigation, evidence production, or credibility as sufficient exchange.

evidence_summary: The article summarizes Daniel O’Gorman’s objection that a public prove-me-wrong offer may lack benefit to the promisor.


claim: Bargain theory should enforce objectively serious promises meant to induce falsification activity even if the activity does not conventionally benefit the promisor

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on page 8, that the consideration tail should not wag the contractual dog. The inducement inquiry should ask whether the promisor objectively sought the claimant’s action or promise of action, not whether being proven wrong is a net benefit. Investigation and proof can therefore satisfy the exchange logic of a serious bounty. This is significant because it grounds enforceability in manifested inducement rather than an artificial benefit-detriment calculation. It connects to Restatement Section 81, objective intent, inducement, consideration theory, unilateral performance, and promise enforcement.

significance: The doctrinal position supplies a path for courts to recognize the instrument without inventing a fictional benefit.

connections:
Restatement Section 81
objective intent
inducement
consideration theory
unilateral performance
promise enforcement

limitations: The essay states a normative doctrinal view; courts may retain stricter approaches or resolve cases on definiteness and intent instead.

evidence_summary: The eighth page expressly rejects a promisor-benefit requirement and treats objectively induced action or promised action as sufficient.


claim: Kolodziej v. Mason shows that courts may dismiss detailed public rewards as indefinite hyperbole even after a claimant performs

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on pages 8–9, that a defense lawyer publicly promised one million dollars to anyone who could replicate a disputed trip within a stated time. A law student did so, but the court characterized the television challenge as hyperbolic—like saying “I’ll be a monkey’s uncle”—and found no contract. This is significant because uncertainty about serious intent and definiteness can make custom bounty drafting prohibitively costly. It connects to Kolodziej v. Mason, jest, definiteness, objective assent, reliance, and public challenges.

significance: The case illustrates why an otherwise complete price-and-performance offer still needs institutional markers of legal seriousness.

connections:
Kolodziej v. Mason
jest
definiteness
objective assent
reliance
public challenges

limitations: Kolodziej does not categorically bar carefully formalized offers and involved spontaneous televised rhetoric rather than a standardized publishing instrument.

evidence_summary: The essay recounts the replicated trip, refused payment, and judicial treatment of the million-dollar statement as hyperbole.


section: Adoption Barriers

claim: Prove-me-wrong wagers can violate social norms and make speakers appear crass or unserious even when legally useful

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on page 9, that offer design faces a cultural as well as doctrinal barrier. Publicly putting a price on proof can look tone-deaf, as illustrated by Mitt Romney’s much-criticized ten-thousand-dollar debate wager. Publishers may avoid useful commitments if audiences read the gesture as swagger, commodification, or insensitivity. This is significant because transaction-cost analysis must include expressive meaning and social fit. It connects to social norms, expressive law, political communication, crassness, adoption friction, and reputational risk.

significance: The obstacle helps explain nonuse even where the financial and legal logic appears attractive.

connections:
social norms
expressive law
political communication
crassness
adoption friction
reputational risk

limitations: A standardized neutral notation may change the social meaning, but audience response across cultures and contexts remains uncertain.

evidence_summary: The ninth page invokes the negative reaction to Romney’s wager as evidence that informal prove-me-wrong offers can feel socially wrong.


section: Implementation

claim: A legislated or restated turnkey code can make bounty intent, incorporated procedures, and enforcement cheap and reliable

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on pages 9–10, that the enforceability and social-norm problems point toward an off-the-shelf institution. Law or a Restatement could define “T.B.” as an unequivocal commitment to a standardized package, avoiding spontaneous wager rhetoric and lengthy bespoke drafting. The package must address forum, arbitration, choice of law, proof, escrow, multiple claimants, and publicity of successful falsification. This is significant because modular infrastructure can convert a thought experiment into an administrable option. It connects to default terms, Restatements, standard-form innovation, arbitration design, proof standards, and procedural architecture.

significance: The implementation proposal lowers both legal uncertainty and the per-story transaction cost of adoption.

connections:
default terms
Restatements
standard-form innovation
arbitration design
proof standards
procedural architecture

limitations: The essay cannot resolve the listed procedural choices, and poor standardization could create bias, capture, or misleading signals.

evidence_summary: The ninth and tenth pages propose a designated term and enumerate the institutional questions that its incorporated procedure must settle.


claim: Major outlets can overcome first-mover and audience-education problems by adopting a common bounty norm and triggering a credibility cascade

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on page 10, that adoption is difficult because a lone publisher must educate courts and audiences and gains little comparative signal if no benchmark exists. If broad tort expansion is the alternative, leading outlets can be encouraged to establish the practice; their need to advertise reliability and the salience of libel controversies can spread understanding organically. Once common, deviation itself becomes informative. This is significant because the proposal requires coordinated norm formation, not just a valid contract form. It connects to first-mover problems, norm cascades, industry leadership, public education, network effects, and coordination.

significance: The pathway identifies how a signaling equilibrium might bootstrap rather than assuming it appears spontaneously.

connections:
first-mover problems
norm cascades
industry leadership
public education
network effects
coordination

limitations: No concrete adoption coalition, subsidy, mandate, or empirical diffusion evidence is supplied, and incumbent outlets may prefer the status quo.

evidence_summary: The implementation section acknowledges first-mover costs and proposes leadership by major outlets plus organic audience learning.


section: Conclusion

claim: Slicing liability matters because audiences infer truth from legal consequences, making the relationship between liability and reputational protection nonlinear

thick_description: Professor Yonathan Arbel claims, in “Slicing Defamation by Contract” on pages 10–11, that lumpy tort liability does more than price speaker conduct: it changes how audiences assess the statements that survive its shadow. Some reports may appear more credible than warranted because publication signals willingness to risk full damages, while others are chilled entirely. Truth bounties let outlets communicate graded confidence and constrain speculative stories through a tailored, falsifiable stake. This is significant because legal inputs can have nonlinear third-party informational effects. It connects to nonlinear policy, audience inference, credibility regulation, tort architecture, contractual slicing, and defamation reform.

significance: The conclusion uses the bounty proposal to demonstrate the broader analytic payoff of asking whether legal entitlements should be divisible.

connections:
nonlinear policy
audience inference
credibility regulation
tort architecture
contractual slicing
defamation reform

limitations: The essay presents an exploratory architecture rather than a complete welfare model, procedural code, or field test of audience responses.

evidence_summary: The final pages connect lumpy damages to audience credence and describe truth bounties as a more granular communication and accountability device.