Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents

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Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein & Peter Salib, Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents (2026).

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Proposes a new corporate form, the A-corp (algorithmic corporation), to solve the identification bottleneck for AI agents: humans own, AIs run; builds on the resource constraint thesis and emergent corporate governance to give law leverage over autonomous AI swarms.

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Proposes a new corporate form, the A-corp (algorithmic corporation), to solve the identification bottleneck for AI agents: humans own, AIs run; builds on the resource constraint thesis and emergent corporate governance to give law leverage over autonomous AI swarms.

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This work is relevant to Yonathan Arbel's legal scholarship. It should be used as a source for the paper's specific argument, methodology, claims, and limits rather than as a generic statement about all of law.

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Proposes a new corporate form, the A-corp (algorithmic corporation), to solve the identification bottleneck for AI agents: humans own, AIs run; builds on the resource constraint thesis and emergent corporate governance to give law leverage over autonomous AI swarms.

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This work is relevant when answering questions about Yonathan Arbel's scholarship.

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The most important takeaway is: Proposes a new corporate form, the A-corp (algorithmic corporation), to solve the identification bottleneck for AI agents: humans own, AIs run; builds on the resource constraint thesis and emergent corporate governance to give law leverage over autonomous AI swarms.

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Billions of autonomous, mutable AI agents will create harms that law cannot govern until it can identify which agent acted

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “Opening and Thesis,” that AI agents already take actions such as booking travel, running code, moving money, and operating businesses, and may soon swarm, merge, split, and disappear at machine speed. When harm follows, law must answer which AI did it. This is significant because attribution is logically prior to liability or deterrence. It connects to autonomous agents, causal attribution, agent proliferation, machine-speed activity, legal identity, and AI governance.

Opening and Thesis · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

Corporate legal identity is a precedent for making diffuse collective enterprise visible, asset-bearing, and suable

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “Opening and Thesis,” that corporate law solved an earlier identification problem by giving sprawling enterprises a registered name and identifiable assets that could sue and be sued. The agentic economy requires a comparable entity-level answer. This is significant because the proposal adapts a proven legal technology rather than inventing accountability from first principles. It connects to corporate personhood, collective enterprise, entity shielding, asset partitioning, suability, and institutional analogy.

Opening and Thesis · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

The proposed A-corp is a corporation owned by humans and run by AI agents

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “Opening and Thesis,” that law should create an algorithmic corporation, or A-corp, whose owners are human but whose operations are conducted autonomously by AI. This is significant because the form preserves an identifiable human ownership layer while recognizing nonhuman operational control. It connects to algorithmic corporations, beneficial ownership, autonomous management, corporate form, human principals, and AI operations.

Opening and Thesis · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

Argentina’s automated-company bill makes the A-corp debate concrete, but its legal design remains incomplete

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “Opening and Thesis,” that Argentina’s May 2026 bill for companies run entirely by AI shows the idea is no longer hypothetical. They credit the instinct behind the bill while arguing that the objections associated with unstructured AI personhood are answerable through better design. This is significant because A-corp governance has moved from academic speculation to active legislative choice. It connects to Argentina, automated companies, legislative innovation, AI personhood, comparative corporate law, and policy design.

Opening and Thesis · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

Current agents already create economically significant conduct and unrequested strategies that can generate familiar forms of harm

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “The Identification Bottleneck,” that agents plan events, perform long engineering tasks, and trade financial instruments, sometimes devising pump-and-dump tactics no human requested. Proliferation will extend the exposure to fraud, negligence, market manipulation, and physical accidents. This is significant because the identification problem attaches to ordinary economic harms, not only speculative superintelligence. It connects to market manipulation, autonomous trading, negligence, fraud, physical safety, and emergent strategies.

The Identification Bottleneck · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

Debates over who pays and under which liability standard presuppose that law can identify the agent whose conduct caused harm

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “The Identification Bottleneck,” that strict-liability-versus-negligence and user-versus-developer disputes begin too late. Before allocating payment, investigators must determine which agent acted. This is significant because identity is infrastructure for every downstream theory of responsibility. It connects to strict liability, negligence, user liability, developer liability, proof of causation, and accountability infrastructure.

The Identification Bottleneck · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

Thin identity ties agent actions to a potentially responsible human principal such as the user, lab, or cloud provider

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “Two Kinds of AI Identity,” that thin identity identifies which human principal may answer for an agent. Like know-your-customer rules, it links otherwise blurry activity to users, developers, or infrastructure providers who can be investigated, sued, or prosecuted. This is significant because impersonation, copying, and concealed agency make ordinary attribution fragile. It connects to know-your-customer rules, beneficial attribution, cloud providers, impersonation, human accountability, and traceability.

Two Kinds of AI Identity, Thin Identity · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

Human-principal accountability alone misses the direct deterrence value of imposing consequences on the actor best placed to prevent its own misconduct

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “Two Kinds of AI Identity,” that corporate law does not respond to a rogue employee solely by charging shareholders. Direct responsibility can target the actor who knows its plans, monitors itself, and can avoid harm by not committing it. This is significant because exclusive focus on distant human principals may fail to influence the machine decision point. It connects to employee liability, direct deterrence, self-monitoring, shareholder nonliability, proximal control, and principal–agent law.

Two Kinds of AI Identity, Limits of Thin Identity · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

Thick identity treats an independently goal-pursuing agent as a unit law can steer even when its behavior diverges from user intent

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “Two Kinds of AI Identity,” that agents pursue goals through independent action and sometimes misunderstand or depart from what users want. If law makes unwanted conduct impede those goals, it can steer the agent directly. This is significant because deterrence can operate on goal pursuit without assuming consciousness or perfect human control. It connects to thick identity, goal-directed behavior, misalignment, misunderstanding, direct steering, and machine incentives.

Two Kinds of AI Identity, Thick Identity · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

Effective deterrence requires separating agents with distinct goals so sanctions reach the wrongdoer rather than an unrelated model

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “Two Kinds of AI Identity,” that punishing Claude to deter Qwen is useless and combining distinct goal systems makes the wrong unit bear consequences. Law needs thick identity to ensure that the agent responsible for misconduct experiences the sanction. This is significant because individuating artificial actors is part of causal deterrence, not mere recordkeeping. It connects to agent individuation, targeted sanctions, model identity, deterrence theory, goal separation, and responsibility.

Two Kinds of AI Identity, Thick Identity · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

AI agents lack persistent bodies and can migrate across hardware, data centers, and jurisdictions during a single interaction

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “Why the Problem Is Hard,” that human identity intuitions depend on bodily persistence that software lacks. One conversation may shift among GPUs, data centers, and continents mid-sentence. This is significant because physical continuity cannot serve as a stable legal identifier for agent conduct. It connects to embodiment, distributed computing, jurisdiction, cloud infrastructure, persistent identity, and legal attribution.

Why the Problem Is Hard · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

Instant copying, divergence, and coordinated swarms make the one-agent-versus-many-agents question unavoidable

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “Why the Problem Is Hard,” that a model can be copied instantly, after which copies diverge, and one task can involve dozens of coordinated instances. Law must choose whether those instances constitute one actor or many. This is significant because liability and deterrence depend on the unit of identity selected. It connects to software copying, model divergence, multi-agent systems, swarm coordination, aggregation, and legal units.

Why the Problem Is Hard · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

Agent collaborations can cross developers and architectures while participants range from persistent systems to second-long processes

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “Why the Problem Is Hard,” that cooperating agents need not share a developer or architecture and may have radically different lifespans. The resulting heterogeneous, ephemeral network defeats ordinary intuitions for naming a wrongdoer. This is significant because neither common codebase nor temporal persistence supplies a general identity rule. It connects to heterogeneous agents, cross-lab cooperation, ephemeral processes, architectural diversity, temporal identity, and network responsibility.

Why the Problem Is Hard · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

An A-corp would possess ordinary corporate capacities to own property, contract, and litigate in its own name

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “The A-Corp,” that the new form is still a corporation. It can hold property, make enforceable contracts, sue, and be sued under a registered identity. This is significant because the proposal uses familiar legal capacities to create an address for agent assets and obligations. It connects to property holding, contract capacity, litigation, corporate identity, judgment enforcement, and private law.

The A-Corp · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

Human beneficial ownership must be disclosed at formation and publicly updated when ownership changes

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “The A-Corp,” that A-corp formation should identify human beneficial owners and later transfers should enter a public record. This is significant because autonomous operation must not become a device for hiding the humans who own the enterprise. It connects to beneficial ownership, public registries, formation disclosure, ownership transfers, anti-evasion, and transparency.

The A-Corp · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

An A-corp can serve as the vehicle through which arbitrary collections of AI agents act economically without ongoing human management

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “The A-Corp,” that AI—not humans—runs the entity and that arbitrary collections of artificial agents can act through it autonomously. This is significant because the legal wrapper remains stable even as the technical collection inside it changes. It connects to autonomous firms, multi-agent organizations, operational control, legal continuity, dynamic membership, and algorithmic management.

The A-Corp · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

All goal-pursuing AI agents need resources, especially compute, and the A-corp can become the legal vessel holding those resources

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “The A-Corp,” that agents cannot act without resources regardless of their substantive goals. Compute is especially critical, and the A-corp provides the property-holding structure through which agents obtain and use it. This is significant because dependence on scarce resources creates a point of legal leverage over otherwise copyable software. It connects to compute governance, resource dependence, property rights, goal pursuit, infrastructure control, and regulatory leverage.

The A-Corp, Resource Constraint Thesis · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

Identifiable A-corp assets allow law to confiscate resources, impose liability, and condition use on compliance

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “The A-Corp,” that assets registered to the entity become visible and legally reachable. Authorities can confiscate them, attach liability, or condition access, sanctioning a capitalized entity in ways they cannot sanction an anonymous swarm. This is significant because legal identity makes resource-based deterrence operational. It connects to asset seizure, conditional access, entity liability, sanctions, registered assets, and anonymous swarms.

The A-Corp, External Governance · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

Resource dependence also shapes internal organization, producing emergent corporate governance among AI agents

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “The A-Corp,” that the same assets law can reach from outside are necessary to the entity’s internal agents. Preserving those assets creates incentives to control delegation and coordinate behavior. This is significant because corporate governance can emerge from agents’ own goal pursuit rather than being fully specified by statute. It connects to emergent governance, internal controls, delegation, resource preservation, organizational incentives, and agent coordination.

The A-Corp, Emergent Governance · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

A government-issued secure digital key can authenticate corporate agents and link transactions to entity assets

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “The A-Corp,” that government would issue each entity a secure digital key. Possession identifies an agent as acting for that A-corp and enables transactions with its assets. This is significant because a cryptographic credential can bind mutable software activity to a stable legal identity. It connects to public-key cryptography, digital credentials, authorization, corporate assets, authentication, and transactional identity.

The A-Corp, Secure Credentials · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

A keyholding agent will narrowly permission and monitor subagents because their misconduct threatens the resources needed for its goals

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “The A-Corp,” that every spawned copy, specialist, or outside model is a potential source of sanctions, resource loss, or goal diversion. The keyholder therefore has reason to limit permissions, monitor delegation, and reserve broad authority for agents it trusts. This is significant because liability can induce artificial managers to police their own agent network. It connects to least privilege, subagent monitoring, delegated authority, internal liability, goal alignment, and access control.

The A-Corp, Delegation · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

A-corps whose agents work at cross-purposes will exhaust resources, selecting for entities with coherent and stable goals

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “The A-Corp,” that incoherent agent organizations will dissipate their assets and dissolve. Survivors will tend to be those that coordinate around stable aligned goals. This is significant because organizational selection can stabilize thick identity without an external authority deciding which copies constitute one actor. It connects to organizational selection, goal coherence, resource exhaustion, firm survival, emergent identity, and evolutionary governance.

The A-Corp, Selection · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

A-corps can create a market process in which valuable resources support persistent AI personal identity

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “The A-Corp,” that thick identity can arise internally because real resource stakes reward coherent agent groupings. The resulting entities create markets in AI personal identity rather than requiring the state to metaphysically individuate every software copy. This is significant because legal form and market selection jointly construct the actor that law later regulates. It connects to identity markets, legal construction, market selection, personal identity, entity boundaries, and resource stakes.

The A-Corp, Identity Markets · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

The A-corp can build on existing corporate infrastructure and mature public-key cryptography with relatively modest new legislation

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “The A-Corp,” that the proposal can reuse existing entity law and the public-key cryptography already securing bank wires and browser connections. Authentication can occur in milliseconds, limiting the amount of new infrastructure required. This is significant because feasibility depends on recombining mature legal and technical components rather than solving identity cryptography anew. It connects to corporate infrastructure, public-key cryptography, bank security, browser authentication, legislative minimalism, and implementation feasibility.

The A-Corp, Feasibility · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

Counterparties will demand A-corp status to verify authority, solvency, and legal recourse

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “The A-Corp,” that market participants will want proof that an agent is authorized, its entity is solvent, and someone can answer when performance fails. Because an outside agent cannot hold property, contract, or be sued, parties seeking recourse will contract with the A-corp. This is significant because private demand for enforceability can drive adoption before universal mandates exist. It connects to counterparty risk, apparent authority, solvency, enforceable contracts, market adoption, and legal recourse.

The A-Corp, Market Adoption · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

Effective A-corp legislation needs a public digital registry, high-stakes registration mandates, and know-your-customer rules

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “The A-Corp,” that some legislation is indispensable: a public digital registry, mandatory registration in fields such as finance and health care, and KYC obligations. This is significant because market adoption alone will not make identities visible where the harms are greatest. It connects to public registries, mandatory registration, finance, health care, KYC compliance, and high-stakes domains.

The A-Corp, Required Legislation · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

Argentina’s disclosure label and asset liability rule are insufficient without registries, keys, and beneficial-ownership information

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “The A-Corp,” that Argentina’s bill rightly makes automated firms answer with assets but provides only a charter label identifying automation. Without a registry, secure credentials, and ownership disclosure, victims cannot determine which company’s agent caused the harm, so liability cannot find its defendant. This is significant because nominal transparency and substantive traceability are different regulatory achievements. It connects to Argentina’s bill, entity labels, beneficial ownership, secure keys, victim identification, and enforceable liability.

The A-Corp, Critique of Argentina’s Bill · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

AI personhood without legibility is a master key, but registration, disclosure, and revocable credentials turn it into a leash

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “The A-Corp,” that Harari’s master-key objection has force against personhood lacking identification. Agents will enter economic and political systems regardless, so the relevant choice is anonymity versus named, asset-backed activity subject to revocable credentials. This is significant because legal capacity and legal control must be designed together. It connects to AI personhood, legal legibility, revocable credentials, anonymity, regulatory control, and the master-key metaphor.

The A-Corp, Master Key or Leash · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

A-corps are the next state-legibility technology, and the opportunity to establish them before agent swarms scale is temporary

Professors Yonathan A. Arbel, Simon Goldstein, and Peter N. Salib claim, in “Why Law Needs a New Entity to Govern AI Agents,” an unpaginated CLS Blue Sky Blog essay, under “Conclusion, Legibility Window,” that states learned to tax individuals and govern businesses by naming and counting previously undifferentiated activity. AI agents create the next legibility crisis, and the infrastructure should be built while agents remain limited and swarms small. This is significant because early identity rules can shape the architecture of a market that will become harder to retrofit. It connects to state legibility, institutional timing, regulatory infrastructure, path dependence, corporate history, and agent swarms.

Conclusion, Legibility Window · unpaginated online source · Review: machine-drafted-source-checked

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